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CONVICTING  WITH  REASONABLE  DOUBT:  AN
EVIDENTIARY  THEORY  OF  CRIMINAL  LAW
Doron Teichman*
This Article presents an evidentiary theory of substantive criminal law according to which
sanctions are distributed in proportion to the strength of the evidence mounted against the defen-
dant.  It highlights the potential advantages associated with grading penalties in proportion to
the probability of wrongdoing and situates this claim within both consequentialist and deontolog-
ical theories of punishment.  Building on this analysis, the Article reviews the doctrinal tools
used to achieve the goal of evidentiary grading of sanctions and shows that key factors in crimi-
nal law are geared towards dealing with evidentiary uncertainty.  Finally, the Article explores the
underlying logic of the evidentiary structure of criminal law and argues that this structure can be
justified on psychological, economic, and expressive grounds.
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INTRODUCTION
One of the greatest tenets of criminal law is that an individual should be
held responsible if and only if his guilt is proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Whether this point is phrased in Blackstone’s formulation that it is “better
that ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent suffer”1 or Benjamin
Franklin’s more demanding one that “it is better a hundred guilty persons
should escape than one innocent person should suffer”2 or Maimonides’s
even tougher standard that “it is better and more satisfactory to acquit a thou-
sand guilty persons than to put a single innocent man to death once in a
way,”3 the core idea is the same, which is that the legal system should strive to
minimize the conviction of innocent defendants by taking all feasible precau-
tions against false convictions.4
This Article argues that the legal system routinely relaxes the burden of
proof in criminal adjudication by adjusting the substantive content of crimi-
nal law.  More specifically, it suggests that legal prohibitions are designed,
among other things, to create a correlation between the severity of the sanc-
tion and the degree of certainty that the defendant deserves to be punished.
According to this framework, defendants whose guilt is proven to a high level
of certainty receive the full penalty they deserve, while defendants whose
guilt is proven to a lower degree of certainty are convicted of specially crafted
offenses that de facto reduce the evidentiary threshold for a conviction.
Given the elevated risk of error associated with these offenses, the punish-
ments attached to them are discounted.  The overall picture is one in which
penalties are distributed among defendants in proportion to the probability
that they deserve to be punished, even when their guilt has not been proven
beyond a reasonable doubt.
1 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *352.
2 Letter from Benjamin Franklin to Benjamin Vaughan (Mar. 14, 1785), in 11 THE
WORKS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 13 (John Bigelow ed., 1904).
3 2 MOSES MAIMONIDES, THE COMMANDMENTS 270 (Charles B. Chavel trans., Soncino
Press 1967).  For a review of the different ratios presented in the legal literature, see Alex-
ander Volokh, n Guilty Men, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 173 (1997).
4 See ALEX STEIN, FOUNDATIONS OF EVIDENCE LAW 172, 177–78 (2005).
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The bulk of the arguments presented in this Article are positive in
nature.  They delineate significant doctrinal domains within criminal law that
are geared towards dealing with defendants whose culpability has been
proven to a high degree of certainty but not beyond a reasonable doubt.
More specifically, it will be shown that doctrines relating to both the objective
and subjective elements of the crime align punishments with the adjudica-
tor’s confidence of wrongdoing.  In this regard, the presented analytical
framework sheds new light on core questions of criminal law.  For example,
legal analysis of inchoate crimes views liability in this realm as an all-or-noth-
ing endeavor.5  According to this line of thought, criminal responsibility
moves in only when the defendant’s conduct crosses the legal threshold that
differentiates between preparatory acts (which are not crimes) and attempts
(which are crimes).6  The presented theory suggests that criminal liability for
inchoate crimes calibrates punishments to the degree of proof presented at
trial in a continuous and nuanced fashion.7  Viewing the criminal framework
in its entirety, the interaction between preparatory crimes, criminal attempts,
and complete crimes suggests that as more inculpating evidence is mounted
against the defendant, additional crimes with stiffer penalties come into play.
More generally, this Article challenges the perceived wisdom that the
evidentiary threshold encapsulated by the burden of proof creates a dichoto-
mous penal regime.8  In this regime, those whose guilt is proven beyond a
reasonable doubt are subject to harsh criminal sanctions, whereas those
whose guilt is proven to a somewhat lower degree get to go home scot-free.9
Professor Talia Fisher, for example, assumes that the “binary threshold
model dictates that the manifold aspects of criminal culpability be ultimately
translated into the legal lexicon’s strict, one-dimensional terms of conviction
or acquittal.”10  This Article argues that this common assumption does not
adequately depict the manner in which the criminal justice system operates.
5 See Rollin M. Perkins, Criminal Attempt and Related Problems, 2 UCLA L. REV. 319, 325
(1955) (“[A]s the common law is concerned there is no criminal attempt unless what was
done went beyond the stage of preparation.”).
6 Id.
7 See infra notes 169–204 and accompanying text.
8 This concept goes back to Blackstone who preferred to allow ten guilty men to
“escape,” 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, yet is also embedded into the rhetoric of the
Supreme Court. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)
(“[I]t is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free.”).
Casebooks teaching criminal law also follow suit and present the question as one entailing
either a conviction or a complete acquittal. See, e.g., SANFORD H. KADISH ET AL., CRIMINAL
LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS 33 (9th ed., 2012) (posing the question:
“how can we really be sure that it is less ‘costly’ to release ten (or one hundred) suspected
serial killers who are guilty than to convict one suspected serial killer who is innocent?”).
9 See Adam J. Kolber, Essay, The Bumpiness of Criminal Law, 67 ALA. L. REV. 855, 874
(2016) (noting that if “the jury is almost certain a defendant slaughtered innocent people
but has an iota of reasonable doubt, the defendant is supposed to go free”).
10 Talia Fisher, Conviction Without Conviction, 96 MINN. L. REV. 833, 868 (2012); see also
Adam J. Kolber, Essay, Smooth and Bumpy Laws, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 655, 671 (2014) (noting
that “[e]ither each element is satisfied and the offender is liable for punishment under the
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An appreciation of the evidentiary role of substantive criminal law suggests a
much more refined penal regime that is attuned to both questions of culpa-
bility and proof.
Aside from its positive dimension, this Article will also examine the
deeper question of why criminal law turned to substantive norms to relax the
standard of proof rather than adjusting the standard itself.  While this ques-
tion has an apparent and straightforward doctrinal answer that stems from
the enshrined constitutional status of the beyond reasonable doubt stan-
dard,11 a close examination reveals that existing practices are also grounded
on principled considerations external to constitutional constraints.  More
specifically, it will be shown that there are considerable advantages to incor-
porating evidentiary uncertainty into the definition of crimes that reflect psy-
chological, expressive, and consequential concerns.
The thesis presented in this Article is part of a growing body of work that
aims to unite the analysis of substantive legal norms with the analysis of pro-
cedural and evidentiary norms.12  In traditional legal scholarship, there is a
clear divide between substance and process.13  While the former is vested
with the responsibility for setting out the primary rules that guide the public
regarding which types of behavior are permissible and which are not, the
latter is charged with ascertaining the relevant facts of a particular case in a
precise fashion.  According to this line of thought, “procedure really is proce-
dure, and substance really is substance, so that the one can never truly be the
functional equivalent of the other.”14  However, as the legal literature
acknowledged long ago, this clean divide does not always hold.15  Procedural
and evidentiary rules can play a role in the regulation of primary behavior,
statute or at least one element is not satisfied and the offender receives no punishment at
all”).
11 See infra notes 48–51 and accompanying text.
12 For several recent examples of this body of work, see Richard A. Bierschbach & Alex
Stein, Mediating Rules in Criminal Law, 93 VA. L. REV. 1197 (2007) (analyzing how rules of
evidence can mediate different goals of criminal law); Ehud Guttel & Doron Teichman,
Criminal Sanctions in the Defense of the Innocent, 110 MICH. L. REV. 597 (2012) (highlighting
the influence of the burden of proof applied in practice on the design of substantive
rules); Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Essay, The Distortionary Effect of Evidence on Pri-
mary Behavior, 124 HARV. L. REV. 518 (2010) (examining how the need to accumulate evi-
dence influences people’s behavior regarding primary behavior).  For an early
contribution to this line of thought, see John Calvin Jeffries, Jr. & Paul B. Stephan III,
Defenses, Presumptions, and Burden of Proof in the Criminal Law, 88 YALE L.J. 1325 (1979).
13 See Paul Roberts, Strict Liability and the Presumption of Innocence: An Exposé of Function-
alist Assumptions, in APPRAISING STRICT LIABILITY 151, 154 (A.P. Simester ed., 2005) (noting
that “substance and procedure are independent, incommensurable dimensions of penal
law that cannot be reduced to interchangeable tokens and traded like currency”).
14 Id. at 177.
15 For notable early expositions of this point, see I CHARLES FREDERIC CHAMBERLAYNE,
A TREATISE ON THE MODERN LAW OF EVIDENCE § 171 (1911) (“The distinction between
substantive and procedural law is artificial and illusory.”); KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAM-
BLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 82–83 (1930) (“The differentiation between sub-
stantive law and adjective . . . law is an illusion . . . .”).
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and substantive rules can be used to influence the fact-finding process.  Con-
sequently, their analysis should be united into a single framework.  This Arti-
cle attempts to achieve this end in the context of the decision threshold
applied in criminal cases and the structure of the substantive norms of crimi-
nal law.
The Article proceeds as follows.  Part I consists of a literature review
upon which the Article is built.  As this review suggests, existing theories of
punishment focus on the primary goals of punishment (e.g., just desert and
deterrence) and neglect to account for the strength of the evidence as a dis-
tributing principal of punishment.  At the same time, theories dealing with
error tradeoffs in the criminal justice system tend to focus exclusively on the
rules of procedure and evidence as the sole policy tools that influence such
tradeoffs.  Part II presents an evidentiary theory of punishment according to
which sanctions are calibrated to the degree of certainty that wrongdoing has
occurred.  Part III surveys numerous concrete examples that demonstrate the
operation of the theory in practice and establishes that significant parts of
the criminal law can be viewed as tools to distribute sanctions in proportion
to the probability of wrongdoing.  Part IV discusses why the law evolved the
way it did, rather than taking a more straightforward approach that would
explicitly acknowledge that sanctions are calibrated to the quality of evidence
presented.  This discussion will shed new light on core issues of criminal law,
such as the role of deontological constraints on setting penal policies and the
importance of the expressive function of criminal law.  Finally, the Conclu-
sion consists of some final remarks and highlights potential paths for future
research.
I. BACKGROUND: THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT AND ERROR TRADEOFFS
This Part briefly reviews the literature on which this paper builds.  It
opens with an overview of the literature on the theories of punishment and
shows that this literature has focused on the primary justifications of punish-
ment—just desert, deterrence, rehabilitation, etc.—when determining what
the level of punishment should be.  It then turns to examine the literature on
error tradeoffs in criminal trials and demonstrates that this body of work has
focused on the burden of proof as the sole tool through which errors can be
traded off.
A. Theories of Punishment
As the introductory part of any criminal law course will probably demon-
strate, the two core theoretical questions that jurists dealing with punishment
address are: (1) what justifies the practice of punishing criminals (i.e., why do
we punish?), and (2) given a justification, how should sanctions be distrib-
uted among offenders (i.e., how much should we punish?).16  Interestingly,
16 Casebooks often deal with these questions in their introductory chapters. See, e.g.,
JONATHAN HERRING, CRIMINAL LAW: TEXT, CASES, AND MATERIALS 8–61 (6th ed., 2014); KAD-
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legal scholars routinely assume that the answers to these two questions are
connected;17 that is, that the distribution of sanctions between offenders
should be based on the theory that justifies the application of those sanctions
in the first place.  This justification-distribution framework has led to a rather
stable equilibrium within criminal law scholarship that focuses on a more-or-
less fixed list of potential governing principles.18
One group of justifications and distributive principles are consequential-
ist and focus on minimizing the overall social cost of crime through efficient
penal policies.19  Deterrence theories focus on punishing to alter the incen-
tives of the individual offender (i.e., specific deterrence) or the entire popu-
lation (i.e., general deterrence).20  Within a deterrence framework, the
threat of punishment is intended to make people alter their choices and
refrain from criminal activity that they would have engaged in without such a
threat.  Deterrence theory has highlighted the considerations that should
influence the distribution of penalties, key of which are the magnitude of
harm and the probability of detection.21
Additional influential consequentialist theories concentrate on rehabili-
tation and incapacitation as the touchstones of criminal punishment.  Reha-
bilitation focuses on reforming offenders such that their values and beliefs
will lead them to refrain from offending in the future.22  Such theories
examine the unique aspects of each offender (e.g., age, upbringing, sub-
stance abuse, etc.) in light of existing rehabilitation programs.23  On the
other hand, incapacitation focuses on the elimination of the risk created by
the offender (usually through incarceration).24  Within an incapacitative
ISH ET AL., supra note 8, at 89–142; PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW: CASE STUDIES & R
CONTROVERSIES 73–127 (rev. ed. 2005).
17 See, e.g., PAUL H. ROBINSON, DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW: WHO
SHOULD BE PUNISHED HOW MUCH? 7 (2008) (“Each of the justifications for punishment, or
‘purposes’ as they are often called, might be used as a distributive principle for criminal
liability and punishment.”). But see H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS
IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 1–27 (1968) (drawing a distinction between the principles gov-
erning justifying and distributing punishment).
18 See ROBINSON, supra note 17, at 17 (“Most criminal codes, and most criminal law R
courses, begin with the ‘familiar litany’ of the traditional alternative distributive
principles”).
19 See id. at 7–10 (reviewing different consequentialist principles).
20 For an early contribution to this literature, see Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punish-
ment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 176–79 (1968) (presenting an analysis of
the supply of criminal offenses given the probability of conviction, length of punishment,
and other variables).  For later review, see STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 473–514 (2004).
21 ROBINSON, supra note 17, at 8–9. R
22 For a review of the rehabilitation literature, see Francis T. Cullen & Paul Gendreau,
Assessing Correctional Rehabilitation: Policy, Practice, and Prospects, 3 CRIM. JUST. 109 (2000).
23 See id. at 137–43.
24 See, e.g., Steven Shavell, A Model of Optimal Incapacitation, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 107
(1987).
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framework, attention is given to the risk of future offenses by the criminal
and the costs of incapacitation.25
A second group of theories takes a deontological approach to punish-
ment.26  Within this framework, the role of punishment is not to further
desirable outcomes but rather to treat criminals as they deserve.27  Given the
somewhat elusive meaning of the term “desert,” retributivist theories often
struggle with offering a definitive answer to the question of what the appro-
priate sanction should be.  Nonetheless, retributivists emphasize that penal-
ties should be proportional to the crime and offer measures that help rank
offenders.28  According to deontologists, the main criteria to evaluate pun-
ishment depends on the wrongfulness of the act committed by the offender
and the degree of blame that can be attributed to him.29  Greater wrongful-
ness (e.g., homicide versus theft) and greater blame (e.g., intentional killing
versus reckless killing) merit a more severe penal reaction.
Numerous penal theories have explored potential interactions between
the different primary goals of punishment described above.  Many modern-
day theorists take the position that the criminal justice system aims to further
a utilitarian goal of crime reduction, but that this goal is limited by deonto-
logical constraints that forbid the punishment of the innocent and require
that all punishments be proportional to the deed committed.30  Others have
advocated for the use of the public’s perceptions of just desert (rather than
the moral dictates of desert) as the guiding principle for the distribution of
punishments on consequentialist grounds.31  According to this line of
thought, aligning public opinion with legal practices can help bolster the
law’s legitimacy and increase compliance.32
To be sure, criminal law scholars have certainly taken note of evidentiary
considerations.  In his seminal work on criminal codes, Jeremy Bentham
explicitly alluded to “evidentiary offences,”33 which he defined as “acts injuri-
ous or otherwise in themselves, but furnishing a presumption of an offence
25 See id. at 107–08.
26 See ROBINSON, supra note 17, at 11 (highlighting the role of deontological desert). R
27 For a key contribution to this literature, see Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth of
Retribution, in RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER, AND THE EMOTIONS: NEW ESSAYS IN MORAL PSY-
CHOLOGY 179 (Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 1987).  For a review of retributive theories, see
Gerard V. Bradley, Retribution: The Central Aim of Punishment, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 19
(2003).
28 See generally Andrew von Hirsch, Proportionality in the Philosophy of Punishment, 16
CRIME & JUSTICE 55 (1992).
29 For a discussion of the two criteria, see GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL
LAW §§ 6.6–6.7, at 454–504 (1978).
30 For an early iteration of this concept, see HART, supra note 17, at 8–13; see also R
Stephen P. Garvey, Lifting the Veil on Punishment, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 443, 450 (2004).
31 See generally Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L.
REV. 453 (1997).
32 Id. at 476.
33 JEREMY BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 425 (C.K. Ogden ed., Richard Hil-
dreth trans., 1931) (emphasis omitted).
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committed.”34  Using this framework, Bentham highlighted the role of
crimes such as possession of stolen property (that can indicate theft) and
concealment of the birth of an illegitimate child (that can indicate murder)
in the overall picture of criminal offenses.35  More recently, Professor Freder-
ick Schauer elaborated on this point and argued that evidentiary crimes are
common in modern criminal codes as well.36  Thus, for example, he demon-
strated how crimes that rest on thresholds such as the quantity of a drug
possessed (that can indicate intention to deal) and the speed of driving (that
can indicate unsafe driving) are geared toward evidentiary purposes.37  Simi-
larly, the literature on the mental state of crimes has also alluded to eviden-
tiary considerations.  The clearest example of such considerations driving the
design of offenses is strict criminal liability.  While strict liability is relatively
rare in the criminal context, there are specific instances in which it is
employed.38  Criminal law scholars have long since recognized that the shift
toward strict liability rests, among other things, on evidentiary considera-
tions.  As Professor Wayne LaFave notes, the strict liability crime is often “cre-
ated in order to help the prosecution cope with a situation wherein
intention, knowledge, recklessness or negligence is hard to prove.”39
All these examples suggest that criminal law scholars are attuned to the
evidentiary ramifications of the definition of the elements of a crime.  None-
theless, while their analysis acknowledges the evidentiary nature of criminal
law, it does not examine the way in which evidentiary crimes should fit into
the menu of punishment of a penal code.  Bentham, for instance, takes as a
given the legal framework according to which men who meet together armed
and disguised are subject to capital punishment “because this is supposed to
be a proof of a formed design to offer violent resistance to the officers of the
customs.”40  In this regard, his analysis neglects to deal with the interaction
between evidentiary uncertainty and punishment.
In conclusion, the literature on crime and punishment has mostly taken
the view that the structure of substantive criminal law should be driven by its
primary goals, and not by the realities of trials and fact finding.  In the words
of Professor Tatjana Hörnle, “The relation of procedural law to substantive
law is merely auxiliary.  We do not invent substantive law to give content to
trials—rather, the sequence works the other way: criminal procedure serves
34 Id.
35 Id. at 425–27.
36 FREDERICK SCHAUER, PROFILES, PROBABILITIES, AND STEREOTYPES 224–50 (2003).
37 Id. at 237–43.
38 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.05 editors’ explanatory note (AM. LAW INST., Official
Draft 1985).
39 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 5.5, at 381 (2d ed. 2003).  For an
early argument highlighting the connection between the burden of proof and strict liabil-
ity, see Arthur L. Goodhart, Possession of Drugs and Absolute Liability, 84 L.Q. REV. 382,
385–86 (1968).
40 BENTHAM, supra note 33, at 426.
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to maintain the norms embodied in the substantive law.”41  Scholars who
dealt with the evidentiary nature of substantive criminal law did so by simply
acknowledging that the definition of the elements of a crime may rest on
evidentiary concerns.  These scholars have not incorporated this insight into
a theory of distributing punishments.
B. Error Tradeoffs and the Criminal Process
A second body of work this Article builds upon is the literature on error
tradeoffs in criminal trials.  A criminal trial can lead to two types of errors.
The first error, often referred to as a type 1 error or a false positive, alludes to
wrongful convictions.  In such cases, individuals who do not deserve to be
punished are nonetheless punished because of a mistaken determination by
the criminal justice system.  The second error, often referred to as a type 2
error or a false negative, alludes to wrongful acquittals.  In such cases, indi-
viduals who deserve to be punished are not punished because the criminal
justice system determines that they are not guilty.
According to the prevailing view, the burden of proof is the main policy
tool through which the legal system strikes a balance between type 1 and type
2 errors.42  It reflects the minimal threshold the prosecution must meet to
convince the trier of fact to determine that a conviction is merited.  When
the burden is elevated, it becomes more difficult to obtain a conviction
because more evidence must be presented to cross the conviction threshold.
As a result, the number of false convictions falls, while the number of wrong-
ful acquittals rises.  It is no surprise that the burden of proof has been
described as the most important element of trial.43
The governing burden of proof in criminal cases in common law juris-
dictions is the beyond a reasonable doubt standard.44  Significant intellectual
effort has been dedicated to the question of what the standard actually
means.45  Scholars have employed different methodologies to present a
numeric quantification of the burden.46  Ultimately, however, factfinders are
still left with open-ended and broad definitions that attempt to reflect the
41 Tatjana Hörnle, Social Expectations in the Criminal Law: The “Reasonable Person” in a
Comparative Perspective, 11 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 1, 17 (2008).
42 See, e.g., V.C. Ball, The Moment of Truth: Probability Theory and Standards of Proof, 14
VAND. L. REV. 807, 816 (1961); John Kaplan, Decision Theory and the Factfinding Process, 20
STAN. L. REV. 1065, 1073–77 (1968).
43 Larry Laudan, Is It Finally Time to Put “Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt” out to Pasture?,
in THE ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 317, 317 (Andrei Marmor ed.,
2012).
44 2 KENNETH S. BROUN, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 341, at 669 (7th ed. 2014).  To be
sure, at times the state may apply sanctions based on a more lenient decision threshold by
turning to administrative proceedings. See Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 96–97 (1981).
45 See, e.g., STEIN, supra note 4, at 172–78. See generally Jon O. Newman, Beyond “Reason- R
able Doubt,” 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 979 (1993).
46 See, e.g., Rita James Simon, “Beyond a Reasonable Doubt”—An Experimental Attempt at
Quantification, 6 J. APPLIED BEHAV. SCI. 203, 204–08 (1970) (experimental data); Rita James
Simon & Linda Mahan, Quantifying Burdens of Proof: A View from the Bench, the Jury, and the
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elevated burden associated with the standard.  For instance, the Federal Pat-
tern Criminal Jury Instructions state that “[p]roof beyond a reasonable doubt
is proof that leaves you firmly convinced of the defendant’s guilt.”47  Notwith-
standing the vagueness of such definitions, it is clear that the standard sets a
very high threshold for convictions.
While the specific contours of the reasonable doubt standard might be
elusive, it is undisputed that it is enshrined as a core feature of criminal trials.
In the United States, the standard is viewed as part of the constitutional
framework that is geared toward protecting innocent defendants from erro-
neous convictions.48  As the Supreme Court noted, it is “important in our
free society that every individual going about his ordinary affairs have confi-
dence that his government cannot adjudge him guilty of a criminal offense
without convincing a proper factfinder of his guilt with utmost certainty.”49
Consequently, despite a clear trend of harshening in American criminal juris-
prudence,50 it is still routinely assumed that this trend has surpassed the bur-
den of proof and that convictions are reserved only for those whose guilt has
been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.51
Historically, one of the main justifications for the beyond reasonable
doubt standard builds on the asymmetric costs associated with type 1 and
type 2 errors.52  More specifically, courts and legal scholars presume that
given the high cost of false convictions that includes a significant deadweight
loss in the form of stigma and loss of freedom, it is better to set the decision
threshold such that the risk of type 1 errors will be reduced.53  As the leading
treatise on evidence law states, “Society has judged that it is significantly
worse for an innocent person to be found guilty of a crime than for a guilty
Classroom, 5 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 319, 325–29 (1971) (surveying data from responses of
judges, jurors, and students to questionnaire items about burden of proof standards).
47 FED. JUDICIAL CTR., JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY
INSTRUCTIONS, Instruction 21, at 28 (1987).
48 In the United States the Federal Constitution requires that all criminal convictions
will meet this standard. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).  Generally, despite
differences regarding the burden of proof between Anglo-American legal systems and civil
legal systems, both apply a similar standard in criminal litigation. See Kevin M. Clermont &
Emily Sherwin, A Comparative View of Standards of Proof, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 243, 246 (2002)
(noting that “[i]n actual practice . . . the civil-law and common-law standards for criminal
cases are likely equivalent”).
49 Winship, 397 U.S. at 364.
50 See JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND THE WIDENING
DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE 3–4 (2003) (reviewing the harshening of American
criminal sanctions).
51 See, e.g., 1 LAFAVE, supra note 39, § 1.8(a), at 77 (noting that “[i]t is a basic policy of
Anglo-American criminal law that . . . the prosecution has the burden of proving beyond a
reasonable doubt all the facts necessary to establish the defendant’s guilt”).
52 For a discussion of the different foundations of the beyond reasonable standard, see
2 BROUN, supra note 44, § 341, at 669–75.
53 See, e.g., Winship, 397 U.S. at 363–64; RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LAW 845–46 (9th ed., 2014).
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person to go free.”54  This result is often contrasted with the burden of proof
in civil litigation, which requires that the plaintiff only prove her case by a
preponderance of the evidence.55  According to the error-cost minimization
framework, when the only thing on the table is the transfer of money from
one party to the other, adopting the preponderance rule will minimize the
error costs associated with allocating money to the wrong party.56  In the
context of criminal trials, however, sanctions entail a deadweight loss, and
therefore a higher decision threshold should be used.57
Legal philosophers have further elaborated on this point and high-
lighted the potential justification for the beyond a reasonable doubt standard
that extends further than error cost minimization.  Scholars such as Lau-
rence Tribe, Ronald Dworkin, and Alex Stein have underscored the impor-
tance of limiting convictions to cases in which guilt is proven beyond a
reasonable doubt to the protection of fairness, equality, and human dig-
nity.58  Relatedly, Professor Antony Duff and his colleagues have tied the
standard to the expressive function of criminal law and the act of condemna-
tion.59  According to their argument, for a court to have the right to con-
demn the defendant it must know that the defendant is guilty and that the
judgment is true.  Employing the elevated beyond a reasonable doubt stan-
dard helps facilitate this condition.
Lately, however, this normative analysis has come under significant scru-
tiny.60  Focusing on incapacitation, Professor Larry Laudan has forcefully
advocated relaxing the burden of proof, at least in cases involving violent
repeat offenders.61  According to Laudan’s analysis of the available empirical
data, each false acquittal entails the cost of enabling more than thirty-six
54 2 BROUN, supra note 44, § 341, at 669.
55 Winship, 397 U.S. at 371 (Harlan, J., concurring); POSNER, supra note 53, at 844–45.
56 See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L. REV.
1477, 1504 (1999).  For an early exposition of this point, see David Kaye, The Limits of the
Preponderance of the Evidence Standard: Justifiably Naked Statistical Evidence and Multiple Causa-
tion, 1982 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 487, 496–500.
57 See POSNER, supra note 53, at 845.
58 See RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 80–89 (1985); STEIN, supra note 4, at R
175; Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84
HARV. L. REV. 1329, 1372–75 (1971) (tying the standard to human dignity); see also Rinat
Kitai, Protecting the Guilty, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 1163, 1165 (2003) (tying the standard to
the concept of a social contract); Alec Walen, Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt: A Balanced
Retributive Account, 76 LA. L. REV. 355, 426–34 (2015) (presenting a retributive argument in
favor of the standard).
59 3 ANTONY DUFF ET AL., THE TRIAL ON TRIAL: TOWARDS A NORMATIVE THEORY OF THE
CRIMINAL TRIAL 89–90 (2007).
60 For some contributions to this body of work, see, for example, Daniel Epps, The
Consequences of Error in Criminal Justice, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1065 (2015); Louis Kaplow, Bur-
den of Proof, 121 YALE L.J. 738, 762–72 (2012); Laudan, supra note 43.
61 See Larry Laudan, The Rules of Trial, Political Morality, and the Costs of Error: Or, Is Proof
Beyond a Reasonable Doubt Doing More Harm than Good?, in 1 OXFORD STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY
OF LAW 195 (Leslie Green & Brian Leiter eds., 2011).
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crimes (seven of which are violent).62  Based on this, Laudan concludes that
“in terms of costs and benefits, it would be better acquitting fewer guilty
defendants than we now do, even if that were to mean falsely convicting more
defendants than we now do.”63
Perhaps even more important from a consequentialist perspective is the
way in which the burden of proof influences ex ante incentives.  Recently,
Professor Louis Kaplow addressed this point and presented a model of the
burden of proof geared toward optimizing social welfare.64  The model sug-
gests that the decision threshold should be set in order to balance between
the benefits associated with deterring harmful behavior on one hand and the
risks associated with chilling benign behavior on the other.65  Kaplow’s
nuanced analysis is attuned to different aspects of the legal system that might
interact with the burden of proof.  Thus, he incorporates into his model
issues such as the enforcement level, the magnitude of sanctions, and the
accuracy of adjudication.66  While it is difficult to articulate based on
Kaplow’s model what the burden of proof should be in all cases, the model
shows that given the parameters of social welfare “the optimal evidence
threshold could be much more demanding or notably more lax” than
existing practices, depending on the specific context.67  In other words, a
uniform application of the beyond reasonable doubt standard across all crim-
inal cases is incompatible with social welfare maximization.
Those writing from a retributive perspective have also suggested that it
might be time to lower the governing burden of proof in criminal trials,
although a distinction should be drawn here between positive and negative
retribution.  Positive retribution means that justice requires both punishing
the guilty and not punishing the innocent.  According to Professor Michael
Moore, the offender’s desert “gives society more than merely a right to pun-
ish culpable offenders. . . . For a retributivist, the moral culpability of an
offender also gives society the duty to punish.”68  In its positive form, retribu-
tivism can be relatively permissive with respect to the proper balance between
type 1 and type 2 errors.  As positive retributivism views both errors as a type
of injustice, it cannot rule out the punishing of some innocent defendants if
that furthers the goal of punishing many guilty defendants.  It is precisely this
point that led Moore to recognize that a preponderance of the evidence
could serve as the decision threshold in criminal cases.69
62 Id. at 202.
63 Id. at 206.  For a careful examination of Laudan’s analysis explaining why it might
over- or undervalue the costs of wrongful acquittals, see Epps, supra note 60, at 1090–92.
Epps nonetheless concludes that Laudan’s analysis is a useful tool to think about the costs
of false acquittals. Id. at 1092.
64 See Kaplow, supra note 60.
65 See id. at 752–72.
66 See id. at 814–29.
67 Id. at 748.
68 Moore, supra note 27, at 182.
69 See MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 157
(1997).
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Negative retribution means that it is impermissible to punish the inno-
cent, yet there is no duty to punish the guilty.  That is, “the retributive princi-
ple of just deserts is a necessary condition of punishment.”70  Given the lack
of a duty to punish the guilty, the beyond reasonable doubt standard is argua-
bly easier to defend according to a framework that does not view type 2
errors as an injustice.  At a minimum, it would seem like negative retributiv-
ism would allow for a relatively elevated burden of proof in light of its treat-
ment of punishing the innocent.  That said, however, negative retributivism
does not necessarily dictate the adoption of the beyond a reasonable doubt
standard as the only permissible standard of proof in criminal adjudication.
As Professor van den Haag notes, retributivism “is mute on how high [the
burden] of proof ought to be.”71
Professor Daniel Epps recently elaborated on this point and showed that
relaxing the burden of proof is permissible within a framework of negative
retributivism.72  In his analysis, negative retributivism only dictates that it is
impermissible for the state to punish the innocent intentionally.  However,
this is not the relevant proposition in the debate surrounding the standard of
proof.  In this context, the relevant question is what the permissible risk of
punishing the innocent is.  As Epps demonstrates, if one accepts the two very
modest assumptions that (1) the state has some type of obligation to protect
citizens from crime and (2) any penal system entails a risk of convicting the
innocent, then negative retributivism must delegate the determination of the
permissible risk of error to a consequentialist analysis.  As he puts it, “[s]o
long as it is not merely permissible but indeed obligatory to have a criminal
justice system to protect citizens from crime, deontological principles like
negative retributivism cannot tell us what precise level of risk to innocents we
should tolerate; instead, we have to resort to nondeontological
considerations.”73
Note, however, that just as criminal law scholars assume that substantive
rules should be governed exclusively by the moral theories that underlie
them,74 evidence scholars for the most part assume that the way to tinker
with the distribution of type 1 and type 2 errors is by reforming the rules that
govern trials.75  After presenting his forceful argument against the beyond a
reasonable doubt standard, Laudan concludes that “many existing rules of
evidence and procedure (including the criminal standard of proof itself) . . .
will themselves need to be drastically reconsidered in order to reflect a more
70 Joshua Dressler, Hating Criminals: How Can Something that Feels So Good Be Wrong?, 88
MICH. L. REV. 1448, 1451 (1990).
71 Jeffrey Reiman & Ernest van den Haag, On the Common Saying that It Is Better that Ten
Guilty Persons Escape Than that One Innocent Suffer: Pro and Con, 7 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 226,
242–43 (1990).  To clarify, this article is a colloquium to which both authors contributed.
The quote in the text is from a part written by van den Haag.
72 See Epps, supra note 60, at 1140–42.
73 Id. at 1142.
74 See supra Section I.A.
75 But see Ronald J. Allen & Alex Stein, Evidence, Probability, and the Burden of Proof, 55
ARIZ. L. REV. 557, 588–93 (2013).
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realistic appraisal of the costs of the errors that can and will occur.”76  Simi-
larly, when Kaplow presents his model of the burden of proof, he takes the
decision threshold to be the sole policy variable on the table,77 and, follow-
ing the same cue, Epps limits the policy discussion in his article to questions
relating to criminal procedure.78
*  *  *
This Section has demonstrated that the current legal debate over the
proper error rate in criminal trials reflects the traditional view regarding the
division of labor between substantive criminal law and the law of evidence
and procedure.79  Within this framework, the normative discussion sur-
rounding prohibitions and penalties is conducted solely in the domain of the
primary moral considerations underlying criminal law.  The realities of fact
finding and evidentiary uncertainty are delegated to the rules of procedure
and evidence, which are vested with the task of assuring accurate decision-
making.  However, it is well established that procedure and substance are
intertwined,80 and the literature has eroded this clear distinction between
substance and process in the realm of criminal law.81  According to this line
of thought, the criminal process should be viewed as one unit governed by a
unified normative theory.  Thus, the rules of evidence and procedure should
not only focus on trials but also consider their influence on the behavior that
the law is regulating.82  For example, the rules of evidence might mediate
between deterrence and retribution as the guiding principles of criminal
law.83  Similarly, this approach suggests that the substantive rules of criminal
law be analyzed in light of their effect on the criminal process, as parties will
routinely behave in light of those rules.84  For instance, the rule locating the
point at which criminal liability for attempts attaches will influence the deci-
sion of the police to intervene in a criminal plot.85  Notwithstanding the
76 Laudan, supra note 61, at 197.
77 See Kaplow, supra note 60, at 752–72.
78 Epps, supra note 60, at 1143–50.
79 See, e.g., Guttel & Teichman, supra note 12, at 609–10 (highlighting the perceived
division of labor within law).
80 See CHAMBERLAYNE, supra note 15, § 171; LLEWELLYN, supra note 15, at 82–83.
81 For a review, see Eyal Zamir, Ilana Ritov & Doron Teichman, Seeing Is Believing: The
Anti-Inference Bias, 89 IND. L.J. 195, 225 (2014).  Recent contributions to this body of work
include: Bierschbach & Stein, supra note 12; Guttel & Teichman, supra note 12;
Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 12.
82 See, e.g., Kaplow, supra note 60 (analyzing, inter alia, the effect of burden of proof
on primary activities); Chris William Sanchirico, A Primary-Activity Approach to Proof Burdens,
37 J. LEGAL STUD. 273, 280–86 (2008) (same).
83 See Bierschbach & Stein, supra note 12.
84 See Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 12, at 521 (“[R]ational actors will always inter- R
pret the dictates of our substantive law through an evidentiary gloss.”).
85 Id. at 520–21.  Additionally, sanctions can be calibrated in order to influence the
decisions of factfinders and reduce the probability of wrongful convictions.  See Guttel &
Teichman, supra note 12, at 607–10.
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growing body of work in this area, criminal law scholars have yet to introduce
an overall theory of criminal prohibitions and the distribution of punish-
ments that highlights the evidentiary role of criminal law.  The next Part
addresses this void.
II. A THEORY OF EVIDENTIARY UNCERTAINTY AND CRIMINAL LIABILITY
This Part outlines the main proposition of this Article—that criminal law
is often structured to create a correlation between the degree of certainty
that the defendant behaved wrongfully and the magnitude of the penalty
levied against him.  The Part opens by examining the advantages of a penal
regime that calibrates sanctions in proportion to the degree of certainty of
guilt, even when guilt is not proven beyond a reasonable doubt.  That done,
the Part argues that the law can create such a calibrated penal regime by
designing criminal offenses that incorporate evidentiary considerations.
Finally, the Part addresses the main moral problem that the proposed regime
raises—the potential intentional infliction of punishment on the innocent—
and shows that this concern does not pose an insurmountable obstacle.
A. Evidentiary Graded Criminal Sanctions
This Section examines how sanctions should be distributed in a penal
system in which the epistemic space within which convictions are permissible
is enlarged due to a reduction in the burden of proof.  As the analysis shows,
in such a regime it might be desirable to distribute sanctions in proportion to
the amount of evidence presented at trial.  Within such a framework, as the
degree of confidence regarding the defendant’s wrongdoing increases, so
does the sanction applied to him.
Professor Henrik Lando laid down the case for evidentiary graded sanc-
tions using a simple model.86  The gist of Lando’s argument is that there is a
positive correlation between deterrence and the certainty of guilt (i.e., pun-
ishing those with a higher probability of having committed the crime will
generate greater deterrence).87  The intuition underlying this argument is
that as punishing those whose guilt is more certain will generate more deter-
rence, it is prudent to target more sanctioning resources towards individuals
whose guilt has been proven to a higher degree.88  As was later highlighted
86 Henrik Lando, The Size of the Sanction Should Depend on the Weight of the Evidence, 1
REV. L. & ECON. 277, 279–81 (2005).
87 See id. at 282 (noting that sanctions may deter more when applied to defendants
who are very likely guilty).
88 A simple numeric might help clarify the point.  Assume that there are two types of
defendants with respect to the degree of certainty associated with their case—Type A for
whom guilt is proven to a degree of 95% and Type B for whom guilt is only proven to a
degree of 90%—and that each defendant is equally likely to be one of these types.  Assum-
ing the total amount of sanctions is ten years of incarceration, then the expected sanction
generated by distributing punishment equally between two defendants is 4.625 (0.5 x 5 x
0.95 + 0.5 x 5 x 0.90), while distributing in a 7:3 ratio towards Type A defendants can
increase the expected sanction to 4.675 at no cost (0.5 x 7 x 0.95 + 0.5 x 3 x 0.90).
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by the literature, the problem with this argument is that it assumes sanctions
should be distributed among all defendants and ignores the possibility of
concentrating sanctioning resources only on those whose guilt has been
proven at the highest level.89  In fact, it can be shown that such a sanctioning
regime, which in effect mirrors the practice of punishing only defendants
whose guilt has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, can elevate
expected sanctions.90
Building on Lando’s initial point, Fisher elaborated on the deterrence
advantages associated with evidentiary graded punishments.91  Her key point
relates to offenders’ risk preferences.  As she states, given the fact that the last
year of a prison term generally causes less disutility than the first year because
offenders slowly adapt to the harsh living environment, potential offenders
are expected to exhibit risk-seeking behavior.92  This suggests that, holding
expected sanctions constant, a sanctioning regime based on lower sanctions
applied with a higher probability will generate greater deterrence.93  There-
fore, Fisher argues, an evidentiary graded penal regime that entails lower
sanctions coupled with a higher probability of punishment will generate
more deterrence.94
One should notice, however, that this argument only holds with respect
to incarceration.  Once the analysis attempts to incorporate milder sanctions
such as fines into the model (and incorporating such sanctions into the
model is a necessity in the context of cases involving high evidentiary uncer-
tainty), then the assumption of risk-seeking behavior no longer holds since
this assumption builds on the unique way in which offenders experience
prison time.  When dealing with monetary sanctions, defendants are
expected to exhibit risk aversion because the utility people derive from
money tends to diminish at the margin.95  If this is the case, then a high-
sanction, low-probability regime might actually generate more deterrence, as
potential criminals will be deterred by the risk created within this high-stakes
gamble.96  Thus, to support a general theory of evidentiary graded sanctions,
one must tie the theory to considerations that go beyond the narrow point
regarding the way in which people perceive prison.
89 See Talia Fisher, Constitutionalism and the Criminal Law: Rethinking Criminal Trial
Bifurcation, 61 U. TORONTO L.J. 811, 822 (2011).
90 In terms of the preceding example, this implies directing all sanctioning resources
towards Type A defendants.  Such a regime would further elevate the expected sanction to
4.75 (0.5 x 10 x 0.95 + 0.5 x 0 x 0.90). See id.
91 See id. at 819–30.
92 See id. at 823–27.
93 See id. at 814.
94 See id.  The insight that criminals might exhibit risk-seeking behavior because of the
unique way in which prison time is experienced and the policy implications stemming
from it were previously explored in Alon Harel & Uzi Segal, Criminal Law and Behavioral
Law and Economics: Observations on the Neglected Role of Uncertainty in Deterring Crime, 1 AM. L.
& ECON. REV. 276 (1999).
95 See ANDREU MAS-COLELL ET AL., MICROECONOMIC THEORY 186 (1995).
96 See SHAVELL, supra note 20, at 480–81 (analyzing risk preferences and deterrence).
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There are three distinct arguments that offer a general justification for
the grading of all sanctions based on the amount of evidence presented.
One explanation stems from the risk of chilling benign behavior.  As noted
above, the relationship between the burden of proof, deterring wrongful
behavior, and chilling benign behavior has been discussed at length by
Kaplow.97  The key factor in Kaplow’s analysis is that the burden of proof
influences peoples’ ex ante decisions regarding how to behave.  More specifi-
cally, as the burden is reduced, wrongful behavior is deterred because the
probability of legal liability is increased.  At the same time, however, reducing
the burden also entails more chilling of benign behavior for the same reason.
The burden of proof is thus bestowed with the task of balancing between
these competing policy goals.
Given this complex relationship, it is not possible to render a definitive
answer regarding the optimal calibration between the burden of proof and
the level of sanctions.98  Nonetheless, assuming that (1) there is a positive
relationship between lowering the burden of proof and chilling, and (2)
there is a positive relationship between the level of sanctions and chilling,
then lower sanctions might often be an effective way to offset the costs of
reducing the burden of proof.  To be sure, however, this reduction in sanc-
tions will also lower deterrence, and therefore might not always be optimal.
Yet at a minimum, the analysis does show that calibrating sanctions to the
amount of evidence presented could sometimes be desirable.99
Another explanation stems from situations involving systematic proof
problems.100  In this regard, criminal law could learn from the insights of the
literature examining the pros and cons of basing civil liability on a prepon-
derance of the evidence.  Scholars advocating the use of the preponderance
standard have shown its ability to minimize the ex post costs of erroneous
allocation of liability.101  Researchers writing from an economic perspective
later highlighted that, notwithstanding this important benefit, the rule also
creates problematic incentives ex ante.102  More specifically, this line of
thought has shown that in situations in which the defendant’s liability system-
atically cannot be proven by a preponderance of the evidence, the effective
legal regime entails zero liability.103  Consequently, the law will not deter
defendants in such settings, and their behavior will deviate from optimality.
97 See generally Kaplow, supra note 60.
98 Id. at 819–24.
99 Id.
100 See Fisher, supra note 89, at 827–30.
101 See Kaye, supra note 56.
102 See Ariel Porat, Misalignments in Tort Law, 121 YALE L.J. 82, 108–15 (2011); Steven
Shavell, Uncertainty over Causation and the Determination of Civil Liability, 28 J.L. & ECON. 587
(1985).  For a comprehensive analysis of the topic, see ARIEL PORAT & ALEX STEIN, TORT
LIABILITY UNDER UNCERTAINTY (2001).
103 The paradigmatic example of this issue in civil litigation is causation. See Shavell,
supra note 102, at 587–88.
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Based on this insight, Professor Steven Shavell has argued that a probabilistic
regime is desirable in such settings.104
Similarly, there are situations in the criminal arena in which defendants
know ex ante that the prosecution faces systematic proof problems.  These
situations can stem from numerous factors.  One key issue is the substantive
norm, which might inherently generate reasonable doubt.  When the gov-
erning norm deals with behavior that is situated on the border of legitimate
activity, such as bribery (versus gift giving or campaign contributions) or
extortion (versus aggressive business practices), it might give rise to system-
atic underdeterrence.  Sophisticated offenders who strategically plan behav-
ior that is governed by such norms will often be able to generate sufficient
evidentiary ambiguity to annul any prosecution.  Another factor in this
regard is the ex post behavior of the offender.  Some offenders know they are
capable of creating significant hurdles to the case mounted against them ex
post.  These hurdles can be both legitimate (by, for example, investing vast
resources in legal defenses) and illegitimate (by, for example, eliminating a
key witness).  Either way, offenders capable of creating such hurdles will view
the effective legal sanction as zero.  Finally, different biases of the fact-finding
process might also influence ex ante estimates of potential criminal liability.
A member of a group who is systematically favored by jurors (e.g., a white
offender) will know that by simply taking the stand he will be able to gener-
ate sufficient doubt and avoid a conviction.105  Of course, when these factors
work in conjunction, their force is significantly bolstered.  A well-educated
and wealthy banker working for a powerful financial institution who engages
in borderline business activity might function under the assumption that per-
sonal criminal liability is simply not in play in her case.106
When offenders assume (even wrongfully) ex ante that there are insur-
mountable obstacles to proving their guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, they
will view criminal liability as de facto absent and will not be deterred.  This
effect is an attribute of the all-or-nothing property of the threshold model
and cannot be overcome by adjusting the size of the sanction given the fact
that the offender assumes the probability of the application of the sanction
under the beyond a reasonable doubt standard is zero.  To overcome this
problem, criminal law might wish to base convictions on a sliding scale of
proof.  By doing so, it will manage to generate at least some deterrence for
offenders who are undeterrable within a framework that limits sanctions only
to those whose guilt has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
104 Id. at 589.
105 For a review on the way in which racial biases influence the entire criminal process,
see Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1135–52 (2012).
106 The recent financial crisis and the lack of prosecutions after it might serve as a case
in point. See Jed S. Rakoff, The Financial Crisis: Why Have No High-Level Executives Been Prose-
cuted?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Jan. 9, 2014), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/01/09/
financial-crisis-why-no-executive-prosecutions/ (“[N]ot a single high-level executive has
been successfully prosecuted in connection with the recent financial crisis.”).
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While the two preceding explanations can illuminate many cases, their
application is still not general.  In some contexts, the risk of chilling benign
behavior is not central to the law, as is the case with many violent crimes.
Additionally, the concern over systematic proof problems does not always
arise, as we are not all wealthy bankers or mob bosses.  A more general way in
which one can justify a probabilistic penal regime is to relax the assumption
of rationality and incorporate behavioral insights into the framework.  More
specifically, decision-making theory draws a distinction between making deci-
sions based on description and making decisions based on experience.107
Whereas the former alludes to situations in which the decisionmaker makes a
choice after certain risky prospects were introduced to her, the latter alludes
to situations in which the decisionmaker learns of the underlying payoff
structure by making active choices.  In such a case, decisions are made based
on a learning process, as people determine from their past choices what their
future ones should be.
In the paradigmatic experience experiment, participants are asked to
choose between two unmarked keys, and after making their decision they
receive feedback regarding the payoff associated with the key they selected
and the payoff associated with the other key.108  This decision is then
repeated, and people’s choices over time can be documented.  Importantly,
while people are informed that each key reflects a distinct distribution of
payoffs, they are not informed what this distribution actually is.  The results
of a wide body of research dealing with experience-based decisions suggest
that when people face low probability events in a repeat setting they tend to
underestimate those rare events.  Generally, people behave as if they believe
that “it won’t happen to me.”109
Criminal behavior usually does not reflect a one-shot decision in which
the potential offender is informed beforehand of the risks and benefits asso-
ciated with crime.  When potential offenders decide to commit a crime, they
often have little knowledge about the probability of detection (and perhaps
even about the sanction).  Rather, these offenders face an ongoing process in
which both the costs and benefits of crime are slowly learned.  Given this
pattern of decisions, the finding that people will underestimate rare events
has significant implications for the design of optimal criminal sanctions.  It
suggests that as a general matter—both with respect to nonmonetary and
monetary sanctions—potential criminals will exhibit risk-seeking behavior
and will tend to discount the probability of sanctioning even further when
the probability of sanctions is low.
107 See Ralph Hertwig et al., Decisions from Experience and the Effect of Rare Events in Risky
Choice, 15 PSYCHOL. SCI. 534 (2004); Ralph Hertwig & Ido Erev, The Description–Experience
Gap in Risky Choice, 13 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 517 (2009); Ralph Hertwig & Timothy J.
Pleskac, Decisions from Experience: Why Small Samples?, 115 COGNITION 225 (2010).
108 See Ido Erev & Ernan Haruvy, Learning and the Economics of Small Decisions, in THE
HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS (John H. Kagel & Alvin E. Roth eds., 2017).
109 Id.
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The existing literature on offender behavior and the certainty of sanc-
tions tends to revolve around the balance between enforcement efforts and
the severity of sanctions.110  The main policy recommendation derived from
this literature is a need to shift budgets to policing to increase the probability
of apprehension.111  However, additional policing is not the only way
through which the legal system can increase the probability of punishment.
The evidentiary decision threshold can achieve the same goal.112  By enact-
ing evidentiary offenses, policymakers can create a penal regime in which
moderate sanctions are applied with greater frequency.
Regarding the size of the sanction that ought to be employed, behavioral
findings suggest that when enforcement is sufficiently frequent, low sanctions
can suffice to properly incentivize individuals.  Based on this insight, a review
recently published in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Science
concluded that “a gentle rule enforcement policy that employs low punish-
ments with high probability can be very effective.”113  This conclusion is in
line with the bulk of the criminology literature that suggests the certainty of
sanctions has a greater effect on behavior than does their magnitude.114
In summary, policy considerations suggest that the law should strive to
adopt a continuous penal regime that distributes penalties in proportion to
evidentiary certainty and that this penal regime should transcend into the
epistemic space that lies below the beyond a reasonable doubt threshold.
The next Section explores how the substantive rules of criminal law can
achieve this goal.
B. Evidentiary Grading Through the Substantive Rules of Criminal Law
As noted above, the current discussion of error tradeoffs in criminal
adjudication tends to focus on procedure,115 and takes prohibitions as exog-
enously given and not as a policy variable that influences the accuracy of the
criminal justice system.  By doing so, it overlooks the interaction between the
content of substantive legal rules and the burden of proof.  In reality, policy-
makers can adjust the balance between type 1 and type 2 errors through the
design of substantive prohibitions.  By adding or removing objective ele-
ments to a crime and by relaxing or enhancing the mental state associated
with the crime, the state can make the prosecution’s case harder or easier to
prove.  This, in turn, will influence the number of false acquittals and false
convictions.  Furthermore, the punishment attached to these evidentiary
crimes can be set lower than the punishment attached to the primary crime
110 See, e.g., Steven N. Durlauf & Daniel S. Nagin, Imprisonment and Crime: Can Both Be
Reduced?, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 13 (2011).
111 Id. at 38.
112 See Fisher, supra note 89, at 824–25.
113 Ido Erev & Alvin E. Roth, Maximization, Learning, and Economic Behavior, 111 PNAS
10818, 10822 (2014).
114 See, e.g., Daniel S. Nagin, Deterrence: A Review of the Evidence by a Criminologist for Econo-
mists, 5 ANN. REV. ECONOMICS 83, 101 (2013).
115 See supra Section I.B.
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they aim to deal with to account for the added evidentiary uncertainty associ-
ated with them.  The emerging picture is of a de facto evidentiary graded
penal regime.  Defendants whose guilt can be proven beyond a reasonable
doubt are subject to the full punishment attached to the original crime, while
defendants whose guilt is more difficult to prove are convicted of the lesser
crime and are subject to a milder penalty.
Overlooking the role of substantive rules is not a minor omission.  In the
realm of criminal adjudication, the substantive track is the main path
through which type 1 errors and type 2 errors can be balanced.  Given the
entrenched constitutional status of the beyond a reasonable doubt stan-
dard,116 abandoning it explicitly is not a viable policy option.  Furthermore,
the web of constitutional rights that govern other aspects of the criminal pro-
cess makes it extremely difficult to achieve this goal by alternative procedural
means.  While allowing the retrial of defendants who were wrongfully acquit-
ted will reduce the number of false negatives, for example, this tactic will also
be deemed unconstitutional in light of the prohibition against double jeop-
ardy.117  The constitutional review of substantive rules, on the other hand, is
relatively lax.118  For several decades, the Supreme Court has consistently
refused to strike down criminal legislation that bears no substantial relation-
ship to injury to the public.119  In light of the difficulty of relaxing the bur-
den of proof directly and the liberal regulation of substantive legal rules, the
latter is the main tool with which the accuracy of criminal trials can be
adjusted.120
To be sure, the legal literature has documented several examples of evi-
dentiary considerations playing a role in penal decisions.121  Furthermore,
these cases often reflect an attempt to grade penalties in accordance with the
amount of evidence available against the defendant.  One group of such
examples can be found in the criminal process.  For one, since plea bargains
are negotiated in the shadow of the expected outcomes of trials, the deals
that are struck between prosecutors and defendants will incorporate all evi-
116 See supra notes 48–51 and accompanying text.
117 See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
118 See Ariel L. Bendor & Hadar Dancig-Rosenberg, Unconstitutional Criminalization, 19
NEW CRIM. L. REV. 171, 172 (2016) (“[T]he Supreme Court has not constitutionalized
substantive criminal law.”).
119 See 1 LAFAVE, supra note 39, § 3.3(a), at 197–200.  To be sure, some state courts have
taken a more proactive stance on this point and invalidated such statutes. Id. at 200–07.  A
similar picture is true under European law. See Victor Tadros, Rethinking the Presumption of
Innocence, 1 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 193, 193–94 (2006) (highlighting the different status of sub-
stantive and procedural challenges under the European Convention on Human Rights).
120 The current constitutional state of affairs is not necessarily desirable.  For a critique
of the distinction between procedure and substance on this point, see Jeffries & Stephan,
supra note 12, at 1344–53.
121 See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 10, at 838–54 (reviewing probabilistic policies under pre-
vailing law).
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dentiary uncertainty.122  Holding everything else equal, a defendant facing a
ninety-eight percent chance of conviction will agree to a higher penalty than
a defendant facing a seventy-five percent chance of conviction, thus creating
a correlation between degree of proof and the severity of the punishment.123
Similarly, many of the adverse consequences of the criminal process are
incurred based on a decision standard that is lower than the beyond a reason-
able doubt standard.  For example, arrests are governed by a far more lenient
standard—probable cause—thus allowing more type 1 errors in the case of
arrests.124  Therefore, defendants with little evidence mounted against them
might face a lenient sanction in the form of an arrest before the case against
them is dismissed.  Relatedly, nonlegal sanctions applied outside the realm of
the law might employ a lower decision threshold.  For instance, defendants
who are acquitted (or even not put to trial) are still subject to an array of
adverse actions by potential employers and landlords who use arrest records
and not criminal records.125  As a result, these individuals might face sanc-
tions even if the evidence against them is insufficient to support a
conviction.126
An additional example comes from the role that past convictions play in
sentencing.  Criminal history is a main factor in determining the severity of
punishment.127  All else being equal, repeat offenders are subject to harsher
penalties than criminals who committed the identical crime for the first
time.128  “Despite the prevalence of escalating penalties for recidivists, legal
scholarship—both deontological and consequentialist—has struggled to pro-
vide a normative theory that justifies this practice,”129 and to date one of the
leading explanations is evidentiary.  As Ariel Rubinstein has shown, enhanc-
ing the sanctions of repeat offenders is a rational way to deal with evidentiary
122 For an early exposition of this idea, see Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a
Market System, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 289, 309–17 (1983).
123 Id. at 314 tbl.1.
124 JOSHUA DRESSLER & GEORGE C. THOMAS III, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: PRINCIPLES, POLI-
CIES AND PERSPECTIVES 151 (5th ed. 2013).
125 See Samuel Bray, Comment, Not Proven: Introducing a Third Verdict, 72 U. CHI. L. REV.
1299, 1309–11 (2005); Epps, supra note 60, at 1101–02.
126 For a review of the adverse consequences endured by innocent defendants, see
Andrew D. Leipold, The Problem of the Innocent, Acquitted Defendant, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1297,
1304–11 (2000).
127 See BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF
STRUCTURED SENTENCING 67 (1996) (“[P]rior record, is the second major consideration in
determining guideline sentences.”).
128 From a legislative perspective this is often achieved through state guidelines, see
MICHAEL TONRY, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 97 (2004), or through specific statutory
enhancements that target recidivists, see JOHN CLARK ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, “THREE
STRIKES AND YOU’RE OUT”: A REVIEW OF STATE LEGISLATION 1, 6 (1997).
129 Guttel & Teichman, supra note 12, at 634.  For a critical review of the literature, see
id. at 634–35.
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uncertainty.130  According to this framework, as the defendant accumulates a
lengthier criminal record, factfinders can be more certain that he is truly
guilty and can therefore apply the sanction the defendant truly deserves.
The informal realities that operate within the criminal justice system are
another source of evidentiary gradation.  More specifically, judicial behavior
might inadvertently foster a connection between evidentiary uncertainty and
the size of the sanctions defendants are subject to.  As a large body of psycho-
logical literature has shown, despite the fact that adjudicators are required to
apply the beyond a reasonable doubt standard in all criminal cases, in prac-
tice, decisionmakers tend to apply a higher decision threshold in cases involv-
ing more severe sanctions.131  This finding, in turn, suggests that defendants
facing low sanctions also face a diminished burden of proof and thus might
be punished even when their guilt has not been proven beyond a reasonable
doubt.
Finally, at times criminal law itself deals directly with evidentiary uncer-
tainty.  The two main tools through which it operates on this front are pre-
sumptions and affirmative defenses.  Presumptions enable adjudicators to
infer conclusions from a given set of facts but for the most part do not alter
the decision threshold.132  Affirmative defenses may alter the decision
threshold and allow the prosecution to secure convictions when less convinc-
ing evidence is presented.133  However, these tools are relatively rare and
cannot be viewed as a systematic treatment of the burden of proof in criminal
trials.134  Furthermore, these tools do not grade sanctions in proportion to
the evidence presented, as once the presumption is triggered it is assumed
that proof beyond a reasonable doubt was presented.  For example, a pre-
sumption that any gift given by a government contractor to a civil servant is
corrupt will certainly lower the burden of proof,135 but it will not distinguish
between cases in which a corrupt intent was proven beyond a reasonable
doubt and cases in which such an intent was proven to a lesser degree.
While all these mechanisms are in line with the evidentiary theory of
criminal law presented in this Article and highlight the scope of the phenom-
130 See Ariel Rubinstein, An Optimal Conviction Policy for Offenses that May Have Been Com-
mitted by Accident, in APPLIED GAME THEORY 406 (S.J. Brams et al. eds., 1979); Ariel Rubin-
stein, On an Anomaly of the Deterrent Effect of Punishment, 6 ECON. LETTERS 89 (1980).
131 For a review of this literature, see Guttel & Teichman, supra note 12, at 601–07.
132 See 2 BROUN, supra note 44, § 342, at 675–81.  Presumptions merely state that deduc-
ing a reasonable conclusion is permissible, an act that could arguably be done with or
without them.  That said, in practice, such presumptions are expected to be of importance
given people’s reluctance to infer liability from indirect evidence. See Zamir, Ritov &
Teichman, supra note 81, at 224–25.
133 See 2 BROUN, supra note 44, § 337, at 648.
134 See Barton L. Ingraham, Essay, The Right of Silence, the Presumption of Innocence, the
Burden of Proof, and a Modest Proposal: A Reply to O’Reilly, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 559,
563 n.7 (1996).
135 See R.A. Duff, Strict Liability, Legal Presumptions, and the Presumption of Innocence, in
APPRAISING STRICT LIABILITY 125, 130 (A.P. Simester ed., 2005) (discussing the Prevention
of Corruption Act of 1916).
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enon that this Article deals with, the focus here is distinct.  The evidentiary
theory of punishment focuses on the definition of crimes—the legal borderline
between permissible and impermissible behavior—and argues that this bor-
derline is often drawn such that it will lower the number of false acquittals.
By going down the substantive path, legislatures can effectively relax the
beyond a reasonable doubt standard and convict people whose guilt has not
been proven at such a high level.
While the proposition presented in this Section might seem radical, it is
worth noting that in many instances the evidentiary theory of punishment
and theories of punishment that focus on blameworthiness will lead to simi-
lar conclusions.  Often, behavior that generates less evidence of guilt is asso-
ciated with less blameworthiness, and therefore both theories will assign this
behavior a relatively low sanction.  The key point of contention between the
two theories emerges with respect to the minimal threshold for criminaliza-
tion.  The evidentiary theory might justify the enactment of crimes that, when
viewed in isolation, do not seem to entail sufficient blameworthiness to justify
criminalization.  However, if viewed in an evidentiary context—as a means to
apply a discounted sanction to individuals who probably behaved in a blame-
worthy fashion, their enactment can be defended.  Taking the path of design-
ing evidentiary crime does entail a serious moral problem—the risk of
intentionally punishing the innocent.  The next Section will examine this
issue more closely.
C. The Problem of Intentionally Punishing the Innocent
As we have seen, the substantive definition of crimes might serve to help
balance between type 1 and type 2 errors and establish a penal regime that
distributes punishments in proportion to the level of proof.  Yet one thorn
could raise a serious concern regarding the moral acceptability of this penal
scheme—the possibility of intentionally punishing the innocent.  This sub-
section will deal with this objection and demonstrate that evidentiary tailored
crimes might be a permissible way to deal with evidentiary uncertainty.
Adjusting the accuracy of criminal trials directly via the decision thresh-
old or indirectly via the array of tools reviewed above functions exclusively in
the realm of the risk of error.136  As a result, wrongful convictions that stem
from such mechanisms are by definition unintended outcomes.  An adjudica-
tor convicting under a reduced burden of proof is aware of the elevated risk
of a false positive, but when condemning the defendant she does not posi-
tively know that punishment is unwarranted.  On the contrary, she believes
that the evidentiary threshold has been met and that the defendant deserves
to be punished.  When the burden of proof is set by substantive rules, how-
ever, the adjudicator might find herself in a position where she is compelled
to convict the defendant even though she knows the defendant is not culpa-
ble.  An adjudicator who knows the probabilistic premise of the offense does
not hold in a particular case and nonetheless chooses to convict the defen-
136 See supra notes 121–135 and accompanying text.
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dant makes a conscious decision to punish someone who does not deserve it.
Such a ruling would seem to violate the prohibition against knowingly pun-
ishing the innocent.137
As a practical matter, the legal system can often alleviate this problem by
creating pathways that prevent convictions in cases in which guilt is absent.
These pathways allow adjudicators to focus on the facts of the specific case
and refrain from applying the evidentiary offense to defendants likely to be
innocent.  If a crime is premised on a correlation between an act and wrong-
ful behavior and enables an acquittal if this correlation is shown not to hold,
then the remaining wrongful convictions are unintentional because they con-
tinue to be premised on the assumed correlation.  To the extent these doctri-
nal pathways can deal with all cases in which innocence is clear, they can
eliminate the problem of knowingly punishing the innocent.  Concrete
examples of such doctrinal tools and the way in which they operate will be
detailed in the next Part, which reviews the way in which the evidentiary the-
ory functions in practice in greater detail.138
If the pathways created by the legal system to avoid knowingly punishing
the innocent fail to achieve this goal, we are left with a deep normative
dilemma, which will be described here.  Within a utilitarian framework,
knowingly punishing the innocent is generally undesirable.139  A practice of
framing an innocent person for the sake of general deterrence—a practice
that has been suggested to be required by utilitarianism by its oppo-
nents140—probably violates the tenets of utilitarianism.141  Such a practice
could lead to corruption because of the wide discretion the enforcing official
holds, and could also dilute the deterrent effect of the law as people learn
that a conviction does not mean an actual finding of guilt.142  Yet because
within a utilitarian framework there is no principled prohibition against
knowingly punishing the innocent, utilitarianism does not rule out a criminal
offense that could promote social welfare at the cost of occasionally bringing
about the conviction of a defendant known to be innocent.  Such an offense
does not prompt special concerns over corruption because its application is
general, and the adjustment such an offense brings to the burden of proof
could bolster deterrence rather than undermine it.143
From a retributive perspective, on the other hand, things are trickier.  If
the retributive prohibition against knowingly punishing the innocent is an
absolute constraint that must be adhered to at any cost, then it is impermissi-
ble to include offenses that will lead adjudicators to knowingly convict inno-
137 See Larry Alexander, Retributivism and the Inadvertent Punishment of the Innocent, 2 LAW
& PHIL. 233, 244–46 (1983).
138 See, e.g., infra notes 215–217 and accompanying text (examining the role of the
good faith defense in the context of strict liability offenses).
139 See Epps, supra note 60, at 1096.
140 E.F. CARRITT, ETHICAL AND POLITICAL THINKING 65 (1947).
141 See John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3, 10–12 (1955).
142 See id.
143 See supra notes 86–114 and accompanying text.
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cent defendants.  However, if the retributive prohibition against knowingly
punishing the innocent is an all-things-considered type of prohibition, then
retributivists will need to examine it in light of the doctrinal reality that the
burden of proof can only be adjusted via the substantive norms of criminal
law.144  The absolute option allows retributivists to hold on to the view that
considerations of proof should not supersede substance in the realm of crim-
inal law but at the cost of adopting the position that consequences do not
matter.  It is beyond the scope of this Article to highlight the pitfalls associ-
ated with this position, yet most modern philosophers agree it is untrue that
it is better “the whole people should perish”145 than that injustice be
done.146  The all-things-considered option requires retributivists to do some-
thing they have been reluctant to do thus far—to develop a theory of the
burden of proof in criminal adjudication and to delineate the relationship
between the burden of proof and the structure of substantive criminal law.147
An alternative for retributivists is to view behavior that creates significant
evidentiary uncertainty with respect to criminal liability as an independent
wrong.  According to this line of thought, the state may rationally choose to
prohibit behaviors that are correlated with criminal conduct as part of its
effort to distinguish between culpable and nonculpable behaviors.148  More
specifically, such behaviors entail at least two distinct evils.  First, they hinder
the work of the criminal justice system because the system has to dedicate
resources to ascertain their nature.  A policeperson who detects an individual
behaving in a manner that is highly indicative of a crime is forced to focus his
attention on this individual to ascertain the nature of this behavior.  This, in
turn, impedes efforts of the criminal justice system to reduce crime.  Second,
as people come to respect evidentiary crimes and adhere to them, a separat-
144 See supra notes 116–120 and accompanying text.
145 See IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 138 (J. Ladd trans.,
Hackett Publ’g Co., 2d ed. 1999) (1797).
146 See, e.g., Eyal Zamir & Barak Medina, Law, Morality, and Economics: Integrating Moral
Constraints with Economic Analysis of Law, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 323, 326 (2008) (“[P]revailing
deontological theories are moderate rather than absolutist.”).
147 Larry Alexander and Kimberly Kessler Ferzan’s analysis can serve as case in point.
After presenting their comprehensive theory of substantive criminal law, they dedicate one
paragraph at the back end of their book to dealing with the burden of proof.  In this brief
discussion, they simply note that “one needs richer theory than we have developed here to
account for how this trade-off [between type 1 and type 2 errors] can be made and thus to
assess whether the reasonable doubt standard strikes the correct balance.”  LARRY ALEXAN-
DER & KIMBERLY KESSLER FERZAN, CRIME AND CULPABILITY: A THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAW 323
(2009); see also Bierschbach & Stein, supra note 12, at 1207 (noting that retributivists have
“little to say about the precise evidentiary rules that should govern the imposition of liabil-
ity and punishment”); Epps, supra note 60, at 1137 (noting that Dworkin and other legal
philosophers have not been “able to articulate precisely how much we’re supposed to prefer
errors of nonpunishment to errors of punishment”).
148 Interestingly, tort law has long since recognized that evidentiary harm may generate
a duty on behalf of the tortfeasor to compensate the victim.  For an analysis of the concept
of evidentiary harms in torts, see generally Ariel Porat & Alex Stein, Liability for Uncertainty:
Making Evidential Damage Actionable, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1891 (1997).
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ing equilibrium will slowly emerge.  Those who do not have a culpable intent
will refrain from violating the evidentiary crimes, and the remaining few that
engage in suspicious behavior are highly likely to be truly culpable.  Again,
members of the community who violate laws that set out to create this sepa-
rating equilibrium are blameworthy, as their behavior undermines a legiti-
mate state effort to combat crime.
Two comments should be made with respect to the punishment
deserved by those who violate evidentiary crimes.  The evidentiary harm is by
definition smaller than the actual harm it sets out to prevent.  In this regard,
the degree of wrongfulness that can be attributed to those who violate evi-
dentiary crimes is relatively lower than the wrongfulness involved in core
crimes such as murder, rape, and theft.  Consequently, the sanctions
attached to evidentiary prohibitions should be less severe than those attached
to core crimes.  However, as the separating equilibrium created by eviden-
tiary crimes is strengthened, the ability to deduce actual culpable intent
increases.  Hence, in cases involving a well-established separating equilib-
rium, the sanctions that may be applied to evidentiary crimes might grow as
the underlying theory of punishment shifts from evidentiary harm to the
high probability of actual wrongdoing.
III. EVIDENTIARY GRADATION OF SANCTIONS: APPLICATIONS
After the previous Part laid out the theory of evidentiary graded crimes
in the abstract, this Part highlights the role that evidentiary uncertainty plays
in the design of numerous doctrines within criminal law.  It opens by identify-
ing how evidentiary concerns drive the design of the objective elements of
crimes.  It then shows that evidentiary considerations play a role in the design
of mental states.  Finally, this Part will delineate how the subjective and objec-
tive elements of the crime interact to create a matrix of crimes attuned to
evidentiary concerns.
A. The Objective Elements of the Crime
The objective elements of a crime define the conduct, attendant circum-
stances, and results that constitute a criminal offense.  The existing discus-
sions on the objective elements of crime tend to focus on the question of
whether a defined crime reflects an unreasonable risk to a legally protected
interest.149  As the offenses reviewed here demonstrate, evidentiary uncer-
tainty can explain a wide range of criminal law.
The first and perhaps clearest example of the evidentiary theory in prac-
tice can be found in the context of proxy crimes.  A proxy crime is a crime
“that bars conduct that neither causes nor risks harm but is correlated with
149 DOUGLAS HUSAK, THE PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL LAW: SELECTED ESSAYS 35–36 (2010).
For a comprehensive analysis of the act requirement, see MICHAEL S. MOORE, ACT AND
CRIME: THE PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR CRIMINAL LAW (1993).
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other conduct that is harmful or risky.”150  In some cases, the connection
between a proxy crime and the underlying prohibited behavior is explicit
and clear.  For instance, take the crime of driving with an open container of
alcohol in a vehicle.151  While this behavior might seem harmless and might
not merit criminal liability, it might also be easy to prove and highly corre-
lated with drunk driving—a harmful behavior that merits punishment but is
often difficult to prove.152  By criminalizing driving with an open container
of alcohol, policymakers can punish offenders who might have committed
the wrongful act of driving under the influence of alcohol.153  Similarly,
many dimensions of corruption law can be seen as a framework of proxy
crimes.  Behaviors such as receiving gifts and making decisions when undis-
closed private interests are involved constitute crimes.154  However, these
crimes often encompass nonculpable behavior.155  Nonetheless, these crimes
often correlate with core corrupt activities, such as bribery and extortion.  In
cases in which it is difficult to establish beyond a reasonable doubt certain
hard-to-prove elements of the crime, such as the quid pro quo element of
bribery,156 these proxy crimes can come into play to punish individuals who
engaged in suspicious behavior.157
While in the open alcohol container and corruption examples the con-
nection between the proxy crime and the actual conduct being punished is
direct, in other cases the connection between the underlying crime and its
easy-to-prove counterpart might be more elusive.  Money-laundering law can
serve as a case in point.  The act of entering the United States with a suitcase
containing $20,000 without properly reporting it can be associated with very
distinct factual backgrounds.  In some cases, the act is not culpable and
reflects an innocent transfer of cash into the country.  In other cases, the
transferred money might originate from illicit activities, and thus the act
itself might be culpable.  The decision to criminalize the act rests on the
assumption that there is a sufficiently large correlation between wrongdoing
150 Richard H. McAdams, The Political Economy of Entrapment, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOL-
OGY 107, 160 (2005).
151 Id. at 160–61.
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 See 18 U.S.C. § 201(c) (2012) (criminalizing gratuities); id. § 208(a) (criminalizing
conflicts of interest).
155 George D. Brown, Putting Watergate Behind Us—Salinas, Sun-Diamond, and Two
Views of the Anticorruption Model, 74 TUL. L. REV. 747, 770 (2000) (“Gifts are common in the
private sector and may represent nothing more than an attempt by lobbyists to secure a
healthy working relationship with policy makers.” (footnote omitted)). But see Sarah N.
Welling, Reviving the Federal Crime of Gratuities, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 417, 431–45 (2013) (justify-
ing the criminalization of gratuities due to concerns over reciprocity).
156 See, e.g., McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 269–74 (1991); United States v.
Tomblin, 46 F.3d 1369, 1379 (5th Cir. 1995).
157 See, e.g., George D. Brown, The Gratuities Offense and the RICO Approach to Independent
Counsel Jurisdiction, 86 GEO. L.J. 2045, 2050 (1998) (suggesting that gratuities “may even
represent bribery that cannot be proved”).
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and the act.  Interestingly, this assumption does not necessarily require
knowledge of the precise illicit nature of the act.  Often, we might not be
able to know what the money launderer actually did—was it human traffick-
ing, selling illegal drugs, or perhaps racketeering?  Nonetheless, we might
still believe that the money launderer deserves to be punished, given the sig-
nificant probability that he committed some type of underlying crime.
Proxy crimes are often criticized for being “over-inclusive,”158 and “over-
broad.”159  Moore has even suggested that such crimes “give[ ] liberty a
strong kick in the teeth right at the start.”160  Consequently, calls for their
reform are routinely made.  These calls encompass both general arguments
regarding the permissible scope of proxy crimes161 and concrete proposals
for modifications.162  For example, a committee report of the American Bar
Association on corruption legislation alluded to the federal criminalization
of conflict of interest as “an indefensible ‘Sword of Damocles’” and proposed
to eliminate criminal sanctions from the relevant section of the U.S. Code.163
These proposals, however, overlook the role of proxy crimes in relaxing
the burden of proof.164  By enacting proxy crimes, the legislature substitutes
hard-to-prove elements of the crime with new elements that are easier to
prove.  This shift, in turn, brings about a reduction in the effective burden of
proof.  It allows for the punishment of more guilty defendants given the dilu-
tion of the elements of the crime, but it also entails an increased risk of con-
victing people who do not deserve to be punished because it is premised on a
correlation to blameworthy behavior.  Furthermore, in a dynamic setting
proxy crimes can bolster the creation of a separating equilibrium between
culpable and nonculpable behaviors.  Gradually, once the proxy crime is
enacted, those who drive with an open container of alcohol or those who fail
to report the transfer of large sums of cash across borders will mostly be those
who commit this act for a culpable reason.
Generally speaking, proxy crimes entail a more moderate punishment
than the crime they serve as a proxy for.  In the context of drunk driving, the
punishment for driving with an open container is notably lower than the
158 See Larry Alexander & Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Beyond the Special Part, in PHILOSOPH-
ICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW 253, 269 (R.A. Duff & Stuart P. Green eds., 2011).
159 See Richard H. McAdams, The Political Economy of Criminal Law and Procedure: The
Pessimists’ View, in CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS 517, 521 (Paul H. Robinson et al. eds.,
2009).
160 See MOORE, supra note 69, at 784.
161 See Alexander & Ferzan, supra note 158, at 275–77.
162 See generally Cynthia Farina, Comm. on Gov’t Standards, ABA, Keeping Faith: Govern-
ment Ethics and Government Ethics Regulation, 45 ADMIN. L. REV. 287 (1993).
163 Id. at 305.
164 In fact, Alexander and Ferzan acknowledge this point, and assert that justifying the
punishment of the innocent who are convicted of proxy crimes faces “insurmountable”
difficulties if the legal system employs the beyond a reasonable doubt standard as the deci-
sion threshold in criminal trials. See Alexander & Ferzan, supra note 158, at 271.  Yet this
analysis rests on the assumption that the criminal justice system employs the beyond a
reasonable doubt standard, which is precisely the question at hand.
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crime of driving under the influence of alcohol.  In Texas, for example, the
former is classified as a class C misdemeanor,165 whereas the latter is classi-
fied as a class B misdemeanor with a minimum term of confinement of sev-
enty-two hours.166  Similarly, in the context of corruption law, the
punishment attached to bribery (a maximum sentence of fifteen years),167 is
significantly longer than the sanction attached to crimes such as illegal gratu-
ities and conflict of interest (a maximum sentence of two years and one year,
respectively).168  Thus, the structure of proxy crimes is aligned with the evi-
dentiary theory of criminal law.  While those who committed the underlying
crime itself without a reasonable doubt are given the full penalty that they
deserve, those whose guilt was proven to a lesser degree via the proxy crime
are given a more lenient penalty.
A second example of evidentiary considerations influencing the defini-
tion of the objective elements of a crime can be found in the realm of incho-
ate crimes.  Most penal systems include an array of primary offenses and, in
conjunction with them, a general inchoate crime that criminalizes attempts
to commit those offenses.169  Attempts are divided into two categories:
incomplete and complete.170  The first category—incomplete attempts—
includes situations in which the transgressor failed to take all the steps that
constitute a crime.171  Punishing incomplete attempts therefore requires
defining the minimum behavior that qualifies as an attempt.  Legal systems
distinguish between acts of “preparation,” which are viewed as legal, and
behaviors that reached a more advanced stage and thus qualify as a criminal
attempt.172  The second category—complete attempts—includes situations
in which the offender committed all the acts that constitute the crime, yet his
plan did not succeed.  In this regard, incompletion can stem from the fact
that the offender did not succeed in bringing about the consequences that
define the crime,173 or it can stem from the fact that one of the circum-
stances essential for completing the crime did not exist.174
165 See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.031(d) (West 2017).
166 See id. § 49.04(b).
167 See 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2012).
168 See id. § 201(c) (setting the penalty for illegal gratuities); id. §§ 208, 216 (setting the
penalty for conflict of interest).
169 R.A. DUFF, CRIMINAL ATTEMPTS 1 (1996).
170 See ANDREW ASHWORTH, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 445–47 (5th ed. 2006) (review-
ing the two types of attempts).
171 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(1)(c) (AM. LAW. INST. 1985) (criminalizing acts
that constitute only a substantial step towards the commission of a crime).
172 For a review of Anglo-American caselaw on this point see DUFF, supra note 169, at
33–61; Hamish Stewart, The Centrality of the Act Requirement for Criminal Attempts, 51 U.
TORONTO L.J. 399, 402–11 (2001).
173 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(1)(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
174 See, e.g., id. § 5.01(1)(a).
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Criminalizing attempts promotes the core goals of punishment, such as
retribution, deterrence, and incapacitation.175  In addition, it enables the
police to step in and interfere with the criminal plot at an early stage, rather
than waiting for harm to materialize.176  At the same time, however, it also
generates considerable risk of wrongful convictions when compared to com-
plete crimes.  By design, criminal attempts always involve situations in which
at least one of the objective elements of the crime is absent.177  As a result,
factfinders adjudicating cases involving such offenses need to speculate about
the missing pieces in the criminal puzzle, which in turn increases the likeli-
hood of erroneous determinations.178  This analysis is especially true with
respect to incomplete attempts in which there is uncertainty as to whether
the defendant is actually committing a harmful act that merits punishment.
Yet this insight also holds true with respect to complete attempts, as the lack
of harm might raise doubts as to the defendant’s true intentions.  The draft-
ers of the Model Penal Code alluded to this aspect of criminal attempts, not-
ing that criminalizing any act taken towards the completion of a crime
“would allow prosecutions for acts that are externally equivocal and thus cre-
ate a risk that innocent persons would be convicted.”179
For present purposes, the key factor of attempt law relates to the penal-
ties assigned to incomplete crimes.  Many legal systems apply a reduced sanc-
tion to such crimes.180  This reduction is significant and routinely reaches
the level of fifty percent.181  At times, the attempt discount is formal and
legislated into the criminal code.182  At other times, it is applied informally at
sentencing based on judicial discretion.183  Either way, as Professor Sanford
Kadish noted, the attempt discount holds “near universal acceptance in West-
175 See 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 11.2(a), at 208–10 (2d ed.
2003).
176 Id. at 209.
177 See Arnold N. Enker, Impossibility in Criminal Attempts—Legality and the Legal Process,
53 MINN. L. REV. 665, 670 (1969).
178 Id.
179 MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 cmt. 5(f), at 326 (AM. LAW INST. 1985); see also 2 LAFAVE,
supra note 175, § 11.1(b), at 193 (noting that a risk of false convictions is inherent in the
punishment of almost all inchoate crimes).
180 See KADISH ET AL., supra note 8, at 607 (“[T]he usual punishment for attempt is a R
reduced factor of the punishment for the completed crime.”).
181 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 664(a) (West 2017) (determining—subject to a few
qualifications—that a person convicted of attempt “shall be punished by imprisonment in
the state prison or in a county jail, respectively, for one-half the term of imprisonment
prescribed upon a conviction of the offense attempted”); Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C.
1985, c C-46, § 463(b) (providing that the punishment for attempt is “one-half of the long-
est term to which a person who is guilty of [the complete] offence is liable”).
182 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 664 (West 2017); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-2-101
(West 2017) (lowering the class of felony by one for most attempted crimes); GA. CODE
ANN. § 16-4-6 (2017) (punishment for attempts prescribed at half the maximum sentence
for the complete crime).
183 See Andrew Ashworth, Criminal Attempts and the Role of Resulting Harm Under the Code,
and in the Common Law, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 725, 739–40 (1988).
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ern law, the support of many jurists and philosophers,”184 and is at
“resonance with the intuitions of lawyers and lay people alike.”185
Despite its wide acceptance, contemporary legal theorists have high-
lighted the tenuous normative foundation of the practice.186  A consequen-
tialist perspective focusing on general deterrence aims to alter criminals’ ex
ante choices and therefore should not take into account ex post events that
occurred after those choices were made.187  Similarly, modern deontological
theories focus on the moral agent’s decision and discount the relevance of
factors that lie beyond the control of that agent when judging her behav-
ior.188  On this backdrop, the evidentiary argument emerged as a potential
justification for the practice.  According to the argument, which was
endorsed by both consequentialists and deontologists, mitigated sanctions
for attempts can be defended as a way in which the legal system deals with
the elevated risk of error.189  As Judge Richard Posner argues, attempts
should be punished less severely “since there is a higher probability that an
attempter really is harmless.”190  Thus, it would seem like the penal policies
surrounding criminal attempts are geared towards grading penalties in pro-
portion to the strength of the evidence.
Interestingly, however, while legal scholars have dedicated a significant
amount of attention to the punishment of attempts, they have dedicated far
less attention to a potentially far greater question—the punishment of pre-
paratory acts that lie clearly outside the scope of criminal attempts.  In addi-
tion to the general doctrine of attempt, legal systems also criminalize
preparatory acts as independent crimes.191  These crimes are to some extent
a close cousin of proxy crimes just discussed.  While proxy crimes identify
behaviors that correlate with offenses that were likely to have been commit-
ted, preparatory crimes identify behaviors that correlate with offenses that
are likely to be committed.192
By enacting preparatory crimes, legislatures significantly widen the
domain of criminal liability and extend it beyond the attempt/preparation
184 Sanford H. Kadish, Foreword: The Criminal Law and the Luck of the Draw, 84 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 679, 679 (1994).
185 Id.
186 See generally id.
187 See Steven Shavell, Deterrence and the Punishment of Attempts, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 435,
441, 456 (1990).
188 See Kimberly D. Kessler, Comment, The Role of Luck in the Criminal Law, 142 U. PA. L.
REV. 2183, 2211–23 (1994).
189 See David Enoch & Andrei Marmor, The Case Against Moral Luck, 26 L. & PHIL. 405,
415–16 (2007) (integrating the intensified potential for error into a deontological frame-
work); Shavell, supra note 187, at 452–55 (arguing that punishment of incomplete crimes
should be mitigated as means to reduce error costs).
190 Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1193,
1217–18 (1985).
191 For numerous examples, see 2 LAFAVE, supra note 175, § 11.2(a), at 206–08.
192 See Michael T. Cahill, Inchoate Crimes, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW
512, 514 (Markus D. Dubber & Tatjana Hörnle eds., 2015).
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border.  Often, these offenses criminalize the possession of things that are
likely to be used in crimes.  For example, the possession of burglary tools,
explosives, and incendiary devices constitutes the objective element of a
crime in numerous jurisdictions.193  In other cases, these offenses rest on
assumptions relating to the criminality that can be deduced from being in a
certain place.  Criminal trespass, for instance, is geared (among other things)
to capture acts that are the early stage of a burglary.194
Furthermore, while in order to secure an attempt conviction the prose-
cution needs to prove a concrete criminal plot,195 preparatory offenses usually
require that the prosecution only show that the defendant intended to com-
mit a crime.196  On one hand, this relaxed standard enables the law to cap-
ture suspect behaviors without the need to fill in all the missing pieces of the
criminal puzzle, as in attempt cases.  On the other hand, it rules out criminal
liability in cases involving purely innocent behavior and thus eliminates the
possibility of knowingly punishing the innocent.  Walking around with a
crowbar is a crime only in situations that trigger the trier of fact’s suspicion
that culpable behavior is in play.197
Legal scholarship has often viewed preparatory crimes critically and has
suggested that they might contribute to the phenomenon of overcriminaliza-
tion.198  According to Professor Ferzan, when the state criminalizes the pos-
session of burglary tools, it in effect tells the defendant, “[w]e don’t trust you
with crowbars because of what you might choose to do later.”199  Given this
interpretation of the offense, Ferzan views such an offense as one that does
not respect autonomy and individual choice.200
193 See ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.315 (2017); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 828 (West 2017); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 590.29 (West 2017); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/16-1 (West 2017); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 45-6-205 (2017) (possession of burglary tools); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-16-5
(2017); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 164.235 (West 2017); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.40.120
(West 2017) (incendiary devices).
194 See Ira P. Robbins, Double Inchoate Crimes, 26 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 97–98 (1989).
195 See 2 LAFAVE, supra note 175, § 11.3(a), at 213 (“It is not enough to show that the
defendant intended to do some unspecified criminal act.”).
196 Id. § 11.2(a), at 207 (reviewing different preparatory crimes that require a showing
of intent to commit a crime).  This final point relates to the mental state associated with
preparatory crimes and will be further discussed in the text below. See infra Section III.C.
197 The criminalization of possession of burglary tools routinely hinges on the intent of
the possessor. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.315 (2017); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-6-205
(2017) (intent to commit some offense); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-16-5 (West 2017) (intent to
commit burglary); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 164.235 (West 2017) (intent to commit forcible
entry).
198 See Andrew Ashworth, Conceptions of Overcriminalization, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 407,
414–15 (2008).
199 Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Prevention, Wrongdoing, and the Harm Principle’s Breaking
Point, 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 685, 697 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).
200 Id. at 696–98; see also Stuart P. Green, Thieving and Receiving: Overcriminalizing the
Possession of Stolen Property, 14 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 35, 47 (2011) (describing the offense as
overbroad since it criminalizes innocent conduct).
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This analysis, however, overlooks the evidentiary function of preparatory
crimes.  Within this framework, preparatory crimes target behaviors that gen-
erate significant uncertainty as to the nature of the act.  Viewed from this
perspective, the message conveyed by an offense like possession of burglary
tools should be read as saying, “we order you not to walk around at 3:00 a.m.
in a distant neighborhood with crowbars since it will be very costly to distin-
guish you from criminals.”  This law respects individual autonomy, yet asks
people to refrain from a suspicious behavior that inflicts a true harm on soci-
ety in the shape of evidentiary uncertainty.  Those who choose to ignore this
limitation set by the law deserve to be punished.
The wider domain of preparatory crimes helps achieve all the goals asso-
ciated with criminalizing attempts, yet it does so at the cost of increasing the
probability of error even further.  Once such crimes are enacted, individuals
behaving suspiciously yet harmlessly could more easily be convicted.  When
viewed in context, however, one can see how these crimes fit into a general
framework of criminal liability that aims to assign punishments based on evi-
dentiary certainty.  Preparatory crimes reflect the greatest degree of eviden-
tiary uncertainty given their broad definition and are generally assigned
relatively minor penalties.  The possession of burglary tools, for instance, is
classified as a misdemeanor in most jurisdictions;201 while criminal trespass is
usually viewed as a lesser offense included in the crime of burglary.202  Crimi-
nal attempts reflect greater evidentiary clarity as they capture criminal behav-
ior at a more advanced stage.  Typically, an attempter has already taken more
steps to further his criminal plot and has crossed the preparation border.  As
a result, attempts are usually penalized more severely than preparatory
crimes.  Finally, the most severe sanctions are reserved for complete crimes.
Only when the offender has completed all the elements of the crime and
evidentiary uncertainty is at a minimum does the law assign the sanction that
the offender truly deserves.  Thus, contrary to Kolber’s assertion that the law
of criminal attempts is bumpy because at one moment a defendant “has no
criminal liability whatsoever, and just a moment later, he has sufficient crimi-
nal liability to receive several years’ incarceration,”203 viewed in its entirety,
attempt law turns out to be rather smooth.204
201 See ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.315 (2017); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 164.235 (West 2017).
202 See 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 21.2, at 224 (2d ed. 2003).
203 See Kolber, supra note 10, at 671.
204 To be sure, the law of preparatory crimes is certainly not a well-behaved, perfectly
smooth function that calibrates evidentiary certainty and sanctions perfectly.  For one,
there are areas in which there are no preparatory crimes in play, thus dividing the eviden-
tiary spectrum into only two domains.  In addition, even if there are preparatory crimes in
play, it is likely that shifts from one crime to the other will entail some bumpiness.  None-
theless, criminal law is significantly smoother than scholars perceive it.
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B. States of Mind
Aside from their objective elements, crimes also include a subjective ele-
ment—mens rea—that relates to the defendant’s state of mind.205  The sub-
jective element of the crime examines both the defendant’s awareness of the
different objective elements of the crime and her attitude towards potential
consequences (to the extent those consequences are an objective element of
the crime).  It incorporates into the law the long held view that “an act does
not make one guilty unless his mind is guilty.”206
Limiting criminal liability only to those who act with a bad mental state is
desirable on many grounds.  It reflects moral judgments and fits into a retrib-
utive framework of punishment.207  In addition, it helps assign criminal lia-
bility only to acts that are truly socially harmful.208  Yet conditioning criminal
liability on the defendant’s state of mind entails the acquittal of many individ-
uals who deserve to be punished.  Proving mental states is a thorny task
because absent a confession it has to be deduced from the surrounding cir-
cumstances.  At the end of the day, in many cases the defendant’s state of
mind might be very suspicious, but reasonable doubt might still remain.  In
such situations, policymakers cannot avoid dealing with the question of how
sanctions should be distributed in the face of evidentiary uncertainty.
Legal systems that wish to alter the balance between wrongful convic-
tions and wrongful acquittals may do so by easing the mental state require-
ment that is incorporated into the crime.  By doing so, the legal system can
convict and punish in cases where proving an elevated mens rea is difficult.
Viewed from an evidentiary perspective, the point is that in such situations a
lower mens rea does not reflect the actual mental state of the defendant.
Rather, it reflects a probabilistic assessment of the defendant’s state of mind
and acknowledges the possibility that the higher mens rea exists but was not
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.  In other words, just as different acts can
serve as proxies for culpable behavior, a lower mens rea can function as a
proxy for the existence of an elevated mens rea.
A first example in this context is the use of strict liability in criminal law.
As noted above, strict liability offenses are often justified on evidentiary
grounds.209  Notably for present purposes, the law usually attaches relatively
low sanctions to strict liability offenses.210  The Model Penal Code, for exam-
205 On mental states generally, see 1 LAFAVE, supra note 39, § 5.1, at 331–39.
206 Id. at 333 (alluding to the Latin maxim “actus not facit reum nisi mens sit rea”).
207 From a retributive perspective, the offender’s blameworthiness is a key aspect that
punishment rests on. See Michael S. Moore, Intention as a Marker of Moral Culpability and
Legal Punishability, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 158, at
179–81.
208 See Posner, supra note 190, at 1221–23 (analyzing mens rea from an economic
perspective).
209 See supra notes 38–39 and accompanying text.
210 See 1 LAFAVE, supra note 39, § 5.5, at 381 (“Usually, but not always, the statutory
crime-without-fault carries a relatively light penalty . . . .”).
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ple, views such offenses as “violations” that carry only light sanctions.211
Along the same lines, when courts determine whether an offense is one for
which liability is strict they often include in their analysis the penalty attached
to the offense.212  The greater the penalty, the larger the probability the
court will find the offense to be fault-based and vice versa.  Therefore, for
example, a defendant who delivers adulterated or misbranded food is subject
to a maximum penalty of one year even if the prosecution cannot prove his
state of mind, yet will face a maximum penalty of three years if it can be
shown beyond a reasonable doubt that the delivery was done with the intent
to defraud.213  This is consistent with the evidentiary theory of punishment.
Strict liability offenses are an effective way to punish the guilty, yet they also
entail a cost in the form of punishing some innocents along the way.  As a
result, the sanctions attached to such crimes are lower than those for fault-
based crimes in which the culpability of the offender was proven beyond a
reasonable doubt.
While strict liability may serve as an effective tool to adjust the burden of
proof downward, it also raises the problem of intentionally punishing the
innocent in those cases in which the presumptions that lie at the basis of the
offense are rebutted.  For instance, take the case of a butcher who sells meat
unfit for consumption even though he takes all the necessary precautions.214
While defining the offense of selling such meat as strict liability will eliminate
the problems associated with proving states of mind beyond a reasonable
doubt and wrongfully acquitting the guilty, it will do so at the cost of forcing
courts to knowingly convict innocent butchers from time to time.
A potential way the law can deal with such situations is by incorporating
a good faith defense into strict liability offenses.215  Such a defense would
sustain the presumption of criminality associated with the actus reus of strict
liability offenses but would allow defendants to prove that their conduct was
not truly wrongful.216  Adopting this framework would probably not alter
most criminal cases, as it would only come into play in a small subset of cases
211 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.05(2)(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1985); id. § 1.04(6).
212 See 1 LAFAVE, supra note 39, § 5.5(a), at 384–85 n.12.
213 See 21 U.S.C. § 333(a) (2012).
214 Alluding to the famous case Hobbs v. Winchester Corp., 2 K.B. 471 (1910).
215 See generally Laurie L. Levenson, Good Faith Defenses: Reshaping Strict Liability Crimes,
78 CORNELL L. REV. 401 (1993).  As a practical doctrinal matter this defense could function
as an independent defense that is external to the offense, or could be integrated into the
definition of strict liability.  For an example of the former from English criminal law, see
Food Safety Act 1990, c. 16, § 21 (Eng.) (creating a due diligence defense).  For an exam-
ple of the latter from Israeli criminal law, see Criminal Code (amendment 39) (preamble
and general section) 1994-5754, SH No. 1481 p. 352 § 22 (Isr.) (substituting strict liability
with “enhanced liability” and determining that liability will not be attached if the defen-
dant “did everything possible to prevent the offense”).
216 See Levenson, supra note 215, at 404–05.  There are many doctrinal and procedural
questions that stem from the adoption of a good faith defense, and resolving them is
beyond the scope of this Article.  For a review of the way in which the doctrine is applied in
numerous jurisdictions, see id. at 435–49.
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in which defendants hold truly unique exculpatory evidence.  Thus, many
innocent defendants will continue to be convicted under this rule.  Nonethe-
less, adopting a good faith defense is important from a retributive perspec-
tive, as it targets the precise subset of cases in which strict liability requires
adjudicators to knowingly punish the innocent.  By allowing adjudicators to
acquit defendants in such cases, the moral dilemma associated with know-
ingly punishing the innocent can be sidestepped.217
To be sure, not all legislative uses of strict liability correspond with the
evidentiary theory of punishment.  The clearest example of this point is the
framework surrounding statutory rape in the United States.  A large number
of states continue to hold a strict liability regime for the crime of having sex
with a minor who is younger than the age of consent.218  This crime carries
stiff penalties219 and triggers a host of adverse consequences that stem from
branding the accused a sex offender.220  While this framework might be justi-
fied on evidentiary grounds, it does not fit into the evidentiary theory
presented here.  The evidentiary theory is not a blank check that justifies the
turning of any crime into a strict liability crime.  Rather, the evidentiary the-
ory suggests a careful grading of offenses that corresponds to the degree of
certainty of guilt.  In the context of statutory rape, this would require drawing
distinctions between cases in which knowledge of age was proven beyond a
reasonable doubt and cases in which it was proven to a lesser degree.  Cases
falling on the latter side of this line should be governed by a distinct offense
that carries a relatively light penalty.
Perhaps a less intuitive but more prevalent example of the way in which
the burden of proof structures mental states is negligence liability.  Criminal
negligence alludes to situations in which the defendant was unaware of cer-
tain elements of the crime but should have been aware of their existence.  As
the Model Penal Code notes, “[a] person acts negligently with respect to a
material element of an offense when he should be aware of a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his
conduct.”221
Imposing criminal liability for negligent conduct is highly controver-
sial.222  The linchpin of this controversy is the difficulty of justifying convict-
217 The defense could also be justified on utilitarian grounds since it enables the legal
system to avoid wrongful convictions in cases in which doing so does not entail significant
costs.
218 See 2 LAFAVE, supra note 175, § 17.4(c), at 650–51 (reviewing the legislative
frameworks of different states); Catherine L. Carpenter, The Constitutionality of Strict Liabil-
ity in Sex Offender Registration Laws, 86 B.U. L. REV. 295, 317 (2006) (same).
219 See Carpenter, supra note 218, at 315–16 (reviewing the stiff penalties associated
with statutory rape).
220 These consequences include both the social stigma associated with the status and
the strict legal regime that sex offenders are subject to.  For a review of the latter, see id. at
324–38.
221 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(d) (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
222 Reviewing this massive literature is beyond the scope of this Article.  For a few
recent contributions to the debate, see GEORGE SHER, WHO KNEW?: RESPONSIBILITY WITH-
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ing individuals who are unaware of the nature of their conduct.  According
to the critics of negligence-based liability, the absence of awareness suggests
lack of control, which is a necessary condition for viewing behavior as culpa-
ble.  Therefore, these critics conclude that “[a] culpability-based criminal law
will not include liability for negligence . . . .”223  Proponents of negligence-
based criminal liability acknowledge the difficulty associated with punishing
people for inadvertent behavior but highlight numerous justifications for this
practice.  For example, if the defendant bears responsibility for his unin-
formed state of mind, then punishing him might be permissible.224
While the negligence debate is fierce, both sides tend to share the same
assumption—that negligence reflects actual inadvertent behavior and that
evidentiary uncertainty is not present.225  As a result, this debate tends to
focus on hypotheticals in which all the facts are certain, which highlight the
challenges of negligence liability.  For example, in their discussion on the
matter, Professors Larry Alexander and Kimberly Kessler Ferzan present the
hypothetical case of self-absorbed yuppie parents who leave their child unat-
tended in the bathtub while going to greet their guests.226  According to the
hypothetical, once the parents greet the guests, they become preoccupied
with making a good impression on them and forget about their child, who
drowns to death in the bathtub.227  Alexander and Ferzan carefully analyze
this hypothetical and conclude that convicting these parents cannot be justi-
fied.228  While doing so, they acknowledge that if the state will be able to
prove that the couple “adverted to even the minuscule risk that they would
forget about their child in the bath,” then it might be able to obtain a convic-
tion based on a theory of recklessness.229  Yet they immediately turn back to
the hypothetical, with its crisp and clear facts regarding the parents’ state of
mind.  Only in a footnote do Alexander and Ferzan recognize that criminaliz-
ing negligence might deter reckless individuals who anticipate evidentiary
problems at trial,230 but they dismiss this point because it creates a “cost of
OUT AWARENESS (2009); Michael S. Moore & Heidi M. Hurd, Punishing the Awkward, the
Stupid, the Weak, and the Selfish: The Culpability of Negligence, 5 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 147 (2011);
Joseph Raz, Responsibility and the Negligence Standard, 30 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2010).
223 ALEXANDER & FERZAN, supra note 147, at 85.
224 See, e.g., George P. Fletcher, The Fault of Not Knowing, 3 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES LAW
265, 273 (2002).
225 For an exception, see HART, supra note 17, at 33 (“[D]ifficulties of proof may cause R
a legal system to limit its inquiry into the agent’s ‘subjective condition’ by asking what a
‘reasonable man’ would in the circumstances have known or foreseen.”).
226 ALEXANDER & FERZAN, supra note 147, at 77.
227 Id.
228 Id. at 77–81.  Moore and Hurd analyze a similar hypothetical and reach an opposite
conclusion that justifies the punishment of the parent.  The focal point of their analysis
continues to be the awareness of the parent to the risk created by leaving an unattended
child in a bathtub, yet they allow for a conviction since they assume that at a minimum the
parent was in fact aware of a “general risk” that is associated with their behavior. See Moore
& Hurd, supra note 222, at 193.
229 ALEXANDER & FERZAN, supra note 147, at 78 n.25.
230 Id. at 80 n.29.
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punishing some who are known or believed to be nonculpable.”231  However,
this final point ignores the fact that this is precisely the tradeoff that policy-
makers are required to make when dealing with evidentiary uncertainty.
Legal rules that struggle with this issue are required to balance between type
1 and type 2 errors.  Any rule that somewhat relaxes the burden of proof will,
by design, entail the cost of convicting additional innocent defendants.  That
is exactly the balance standing at the core of the rule.
The reality of criminal adjudication is, of course, very different from the
hypotheticals the literature has dealt with.  Somehow, very rarely does a par-
ent who brought about the death of his child take the stand to state that he
knowingly risked his child’s life.  Rather, a compelling case that focuses on
personal grief and the extreme nature of the situation is much more likely.
As a result, distinguishing between advertent and inadvertent behavior is
often close to impossible, and factfinders face grave uncertainty as to the
nature of the defendant’s state of mind.  Negligence liability turns a dichoto-
mous decision (advertent/guilty versus inadvertent/not guilty) into a more
nuanced decision that can deal with evidentiary uncertainty.  When proof
beyond a reasonable doubt demonstrating that the defendant knowingly
took a risk is available, a determination of (at least) recklessness is in order.
In cases in which it seems like the defendant knowingly took a risk but proof
beyond a reasonable doubt is not available, the negligence option comes into
play.
Incorporating evidentiary uncertainty into the discussion on objective
standards in criminal law sheds new light on numerous concrete legal
debates.  For example, take the ongoing discussion in Anglo-American juris-
dictions about whether an objective standard should be applied to the defen-
dant’s state of mind regarding lack of consent in rape cases.232  Regulating
sex through criminal law is a tricky task.  On the one hand, the protected
interests at hand are of great importance, and as a result convicting those
who are truly guilty of sex crimes is a necessity for any well-functioning crimi-
nal justice system.  On the other hand, sex is a socially desirable activity, and
drawing the line between permissible and impermissible acts entails a signifi-
cant risk of punishing the innocent.  Therefore, policymakers aim to both
punish sex offenders and avoid the chilling effect created by punishing
nonculpable sexual activity.  The definition of rape and the grading of differ-
ent types of rape can play an important role in this regard.
In many cases of alleged acquaintance rape, the defendant claims that
he truly believed that sex was consensual and therefore should not be
231 Id.
232 Doctrinally this question could come into play in two ways.  First, the law could
define rape as a negligence crime by applying an objective standard to the element of
consent directly.  This is the case, for example, in English criminal law. See Sexual
Offences Act 2003, c. 42, § 1(1)(c) (Eng.).  Second, the law could allow for the use of the
mistake of fact defense with respect to knowledge of lack of consent, and allow for the
defense only in cases in which the mistake was reasonable.  This is the case in some jurisdic-
tions in the United States. See KADISH ET AL., supra note 8, at 396–97. R
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branded a rapist.233  Jurists have been debating what the proper treatment of
such defendants is.  Some have argued that because criminal law focuses on
the culpability of the offender, it is impermissible to punish someone who
made an honest mistake as to consent, even if that mistake was unreasona-
ble.234  Others have stressed the need to focus on the victim’s state of mind
and on denying offenders the possibility of annulling criminal liability by sim-
ply ignoring victims.235  For the most part, this debate has assumed factual
clarity and presumed that the negligent rapist is truly unaware of lack of con-
sent.236  Inserting evidentiary uncertainty into the debate presents an addi-
tional powerful argument in favor of negligence-based rape.
It is extremely easy to present a mistake of fact defense in virtually all
nonviolent acquaintance rape cases.  Such a defense does not even require
the defendant to enter the dangerous realm of he-said-she-said adjudication,
as it accepts the victim’s version as true and only adds another dimension to
the event in dispute that only the defendant can attest to.  As a result, this
defense could easily raise reasonable doubt with respect to the defendant’s
guilt and bring about the release of many guilty individuals.  Lowering the
mens rea of rape to negligence enables the criminal justice system to bypass
the need to ascertain the defendant’s precise mental state beyond a reasona-
ble doubt and thus allows it to convict more guilty individuals.  When the
evidence is sufficiently suspicious to suggest that the defendant probably
knew (or at least suspected) that consent was absent, a finding of negligence
with respect to consent can capture the evidentiary picture.
To be sure, unlike the case of homicide in which jurisdictions enact a
graded scale of offenses that enables the calibration of penalties with the
amount of inculpating evidence that is presented, jurisdictions do not grade
rape in the same manner.  Rather, jurisdictions routinely establish a minimal
threshold to the offense (usually recklessness or negligence) and apply it to
all rape cases.237  Viewed from an evidentiary perspective, grading rape and
using different mental states to distinguish between distinct levels of certainty
could help improve the accuracy of the criminal process.  Whereas the ele-
vated crime that entails a subjective mens rea will be reserved for those whose
guilt has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, negligence rape will be
used in cases in which some doubt remains.238
That said, the concept of evidentiary grading is not alien to rape law.
Past codifications of the offense were sensitive to evidentiary considerations
through the objective elements of the crime and graded punishment in
233 See Ian Ayres & Katharine K. Baker, A Separate Crime of Reckless Sex, 72 U. CHI. L. REV.
599, 599–601 (2005) (reviewing proof problems in acquaintance rape cases).
234 See Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions v. Morgan [1975] 2 All ER 347 (HL) 347 (Eng.).
235 See Toni Pickard, Culpable Mistakes and Rape: Relating Mens Rea to the Crime, 30 U.
TORONTO L.J. 75, 76–77 (1980).
236 Id. (analyzing a factually clear hypothetical rape case).
237 See supra note 232.
238 For a proposal to grade rape according to mental states based on considerations of
blame and incentives, see Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1102–05 (1986).
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accordance with the level of certainty.  The marital exemption illustrates this
point, as the perceived heightened risk of error led to more lenient policies
towards husbands who raped their wives.239  As time passed and the empiri-
cal assertion at the base of this exemption eroded (along with other norma-
tive premises it depended on),240 the legal terrain in the area of rape law
shifted.  Given the relatively unstable state of rape law and the tremendous
reforms this body of law has recently undergone,241 the possibility of graded
rape offenses based on different states of mind seems like a plausible way in
which the law might evolve in the coming years.242
The evidentiary theory of negligence also sheds light on the ongoing
debate regarding the individualization of the negligence standard in criminal
law.  This debate has focused on whether negligence should be defined
objectively as a uniform standard applicable to all or subjectively as an indi-
vidual standard attuned to the unique characteristics of the parties at hand.
In other words, should the law account for attributes such as the defendant’s
intelligence, physical capabilities, sex, and age when determining whether
they violated their obligation to behave reasonably.  On one side of this
debate stand those who argue that negligence is a purely objective standard
239 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 (AM. LAW INST. 1985) (incorporating the require-
ment “a female not his wife” into the definition of rape and thus degrading marital rape to
a simple assault under MPC § 211.1).  In their study on people’s penal intuitions, Robin-
son and Darley examine the way in which people rank different rape scenarios.  Among
other things, participants in the study were asked to evaluate numerous rape cases, which
included a case of stranger rape and a marital rape case.  The results suggest that people
ranked stranger rape as worthy of a greater punishment than marital rape.  While the study
did not question participants directly on matters of proof, participants evaluated whether
the victim in the different scenarios consented (though all scenarios explicitly stated that
sex was nonconsensual).  Interestingly, subjects presumed that consent was present signifi-
cantly more in the marital case, suggesting that their penal ranking corresponded with
their evidentiary assessment of the scenario. See PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY,
JUSTICE, LIABILITY AND BLAME: COMMUNITY VIEWS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 160–69 (1995).
240 See Michael Gary Hilf, Marital Privacy and Spousal Rape, 16 NEW ENG. L. REV. 31, 41
(1980).
241 For a review of legal reforms in the area, see CASSIA SPOHN & JULIE HORNEY, RAPE
LAW REFORM: A GRASSROOTS REVOLUTION AND ITS IMPACT 17–27 (1992); Stacy Futter &
Walter R. Mebane, Jr., The Effects of Rape Law Reform on Rape Case Processing, 16 BERKELEY
WOMEN’S L.J. 72, 77–80 (2001).
242 An alternative path legislatures might take is to enact new proxy crimes that include
objective elements that correlate with rape.  Ayres and Baker, for example, propose to
criminalize the act of having sexual intercourse without a condom in a first-time sexual
encounter. See Ayres & Baker, supra note 233, at 601.  While this proposal aims to achieve
numerous goals, it can also help alleviate some of the evidentiary problems associated with
acquaintance rape cases.  As Ayres and Baker note, “[r]easonable doubts can remain
whether an alleged acquaintance rapist raped, but there is often no question that he
engaged in an unprotected first-time sexual encounter.  In such a case there could at least
be a conviction, albeit for a much less serious offense.” Id. at 603.
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that defines the boundaries of permissible conduct in society.243  On the
other side of the debate stand those who focus on the defendant’s culpability
and therefore argue that criminal negligence should be judged in light of the
defendant’s capabilities.244  In the United States, the Model Penal Code
takes a somewhat ambiguous stand on this point,245 and cases can be cited to
support both propositions.246
If the negligence standard aims to capture situations in which subjective
mens rea is likely to be present but is difficult to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt, then individualizing it is desirable.  An individualized negligence stan-
dard enables the factfinder to examine more accurately the probability of a
subjective mens rea’s existence.  If the defendant is sharp and intelligent, he
is far more likely to truly understand the nature of his actions.  However, if
the defendant is clumsy and foolish he is likely to have acted in a truly inad-
vertent fashion.  By incorporating all the personal information into the deter-
mination of negligence, the court can better ascertain what the probability of
a subjective mens rea is and whether this probability merits punishment.
Note that a comparison between individualized negligence and strict lia-
bility highlights the relative advantage of the former in preventing erroneous
convictions.  When liability is strict, courts might be compelled to convict
blameless individuals in cases that do not involve evidentiary uncertainty
(especially if a good faith defense is not incorporated into the crime).
Attaching a subjective mens rea to the offense would allow the court to acquit
all blameless individuals, but at the cost of acquitting many guilty defendants
who would manage to generate reasonable doubt.  Individualized negligence
can serve as a convenient middle ground that allows courts to carefully
examine the facts of each case and only punish defendants whose guilt has
been established (although perhaps not beyond a reasonable doubt).
C. The Interaction Between the Objective and the Subjective Elements of the Crime
Thus far, the analysis has separately examined the role of the objective
and subjective elements of the crime in creating a penal regime that corre-
lates punishment with evidence.  In reality, these two elements interact, creat-
ing a complex matrix of combinations.  By simultaneously adjusting both
elements, legislatures can define crimes that capture a wide spectrum of evi-
dentiary uncertainty ranging from the very suspicious to the mostly benign.
243 See GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW 100–01 (2d ed. 1961).  For an early exposi-
tion of the thesis that the law should adopt objective liability standards, see OLIVER WEN-
DELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 108 (1881).
244 See HART, supra note 17, at 153–56. R
245 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (AM LAW INST. 1985) (when determining what is rea-
sonable the factfinder should consider “the nature and purpose of the [defendant’s] con-
duct and the circumstances known to him”).
246 Compare State v. Everhart, 231 S.E.2d 604, 607 (N.C. 1977) (defendant’s low IQ was
a sufficient reason to find her not negligent), with State v. Patterson, 27 A.3d 374, 381
(Conn. App. Ct. 2011) (defendant found negligent despite low IQ).
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The intent requirement attached to preparatory crimes demonstrates
this point.  Usually, such crimes require the prosecution to prove that the
defendant intended to engage in some type of unlawful behavior.  It is a
crime to buy a map or a railway timetable only if one does so with the intent
to commit an act of terrorism.247  While this requirement is relatively less
restrictive than the mental state requirement attached to criminal attempt
(because it does not require the showing of a concrete criminal plan), it still
creates a significant hurdle for the prosecution.  Creating this hurdle is
important given the harmless nature of many of the acts covered by prepara-
tory crimes and the imperfect correlation between those acts and actual
wrongdoing.  The added intent requirement aims to separate the culpable
from the nonculpable by forcing the prosecution to prove the suspicious
nature of the defendant’s conduct.
However, the intent hurdle may sometimes prove difficult to surpass for
the same reason it is important—the harmless nature of many of the acts that
preparatory crimes deal with.  For example, when the law criminalizes the
possession of things that have dual uses—both criminal and legitimate—then
a defendant, especially one who acts strategically and plans his crime pru-
dently, might easily raise reasonable doubt as to whether he intended to
behave illegally.  To cope with this, legislatures can create a menu of prepara-
tory crimes that differ with respect to their mental states.  Cases in which the
illicit intent can be proved beyond a reasonable doubt are captured by the
elevated crime and punished relatively harshly, while cases in which the illicit
intent cannot be proved beyond a reasonable doubt are relegated to a crime
that does not require a showing of bad intent.  Thus, for instance, jurisdic-
tions differentiate between those who carry a “destructive device” with an
intent to use that device wrongfully and those whose intent is unclear (and is
therefore not an element of the crime), reserving harsher sanctions for the
former.248
A second example of the type of offenses that lie within the policy matrix
relates to the awareness requirement in proxy crimes and preparatory
offenses.  Generally speaking, criminal liability is attached only when the
prosecution can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was
aware of the nature of his acts.249  As noted above, this requirement gener-
ates a significant amount of false acquittals, given the evidentiary difficulties
it entails.250  These difficulties are further exacerbated in the context of
proxy crimes and preparatory offenses given the equivocal nature of the acts
they cover.  As a result, proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defen-
247 See Andrew Ashworth & Lucia Zedner, Just Prevention: Preventive Rationales and the
Limits of the Criminal Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW, supra note
158, at 285 (alluding to the prohibitions created by the Terrorism Act 2006 (UK)).
248 Compare CAL. PENAL CODE § 18710 (West 2017) (possession with no specific intent),
with CAL. PENAL CODE § 18740 (West 2017) (possession with intent to injure, intimidate, or
terrorize any person).
249 See Jeffrey S. Parker, The Economics of Mens Rea, 79 VA. L. REV. 741, 744–45 (1993).
250 See supra notes 207–208 and accompanying text.
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dant was aware of the nature of his behavior might be an insurmountable
task for the prosecution, and, as a result, the purpose of these crimes might
be frustrated.
By enacting proxy crimes and preparatory offenses that do not include a
subjective awareness requirement, legislatures can capture within the crimi-
nal law cases in which defendants engage in potentially harmful behavior
with a state of mind that is difficult to prove.  For instance, take an individual
caught carrying a concealed weapon for which he holds a license through a
security checkpoint at an airport.  This individual might be very blamewor-
thy; he may be doing this knowingly because he is on his way to hijack a
plane.  However, he might also be completely innocent; he may be carrying
the gun inadvertently.  Proving his precise state of mind is a thorny task
because he could raise reasonable doubt about whether the situation is the
result of an honest mistake (i.e., “oops, silly me, I must have got my bags
mixed up when rushing to the airport at 5:00 a.m.”).  By creating an offense
that criminalizes the negligent carrying of a gun through an airport security
checkpoint, the legislature can tailor a sanctioning regime that is attuned to
the strength of the evidence.  While individuals caught with guns at airport
security checkpoints can be punished even if it cannot be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt that they were aware of the gun in their possession,251
severe sanctions are reserved for cases in which the prosecution can establish
beyond a reasonable doubt that the possession was part of a serious criminal
plot.252
IV. UNDERSTANDING THE EVIDENTIARY STRUCTURE OF CRIMINAL LAW
The previous Part was mostly descriptive; it showed that substantive
crimes are often structured such that penalties are distributed in accordance
with the certainty of wrongdoing.  This Part delves more deeply into theory
and examines why the law chose to alter the burden of proof in criminal
trials using the substantive rules that govern those trials.  Arguably, directly
altering the policy tool intended to strike the balance between type 1 and
type 2 errors—namely, the burden of proof—could achieve this goal in a far
more simple, precise, and transparent manner.  As the analysis will show, the
path on which the law traveled is not merely an artifact of constitutional con-
straints.253  Rather, psychological, economic, and expressive considerations
might be the driving force behind the structure of the law.
251 See 49 U.S.C. § 46505(b) (2012) (criminalizing the carrying of a weapon on an air-
craft and setting a maximum sentence of ten years).  The required mens rea for this crime
is negligence (defendant should have known he was carrying a weapon), and the check-
point scenario was found to constitute an attempt to commit it. See United States v. Gar-
rett, 984 F.2d 1402, 1412 (5th Cir. 1993).
252 See 49 U.S.C. § 46502 (criminalizing aircraft piracy and setting a minimum sentence
of twenty years).
253 On the constitutional requirements regarding the burden of proof, see supra notes
48–51 and accompanying text.
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A. The Psychological Perspective: Relaxing the Burden of Proof While Adhering to
a Rigid Moral Constraint
The elevated standard of proof in criminal trials is often viewed as a rigid
external constraint imposed on the legal system.  Going back to the Bible,
the prohibition against punishing the innocent was phrased in absolute
terms: “the innocent and righteous slay thou not.”254  American caselaw fol-
lowed this line of thought as well.  One early case described the standard as a
“Divine precept.”255  More recently, the leading Supreme Court case on the
topic referred to the standard as a “bedrock ‘axiomatic and elementary’ prin-
ciple whose ‘enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our
criminal law.’”256  As Professor Epps notes, commentators and jurists have
long taken this standard to be a type of “self-evident” truth.257
Furthermore, while by definition the standard entails some risk of con-
victing the innocent, courts have stubbornly refused to quantify this risk in an
explicit manner.258  When faced with a case in which the trial court put the
standard at seventy-five percent, the Supreme Court of Nevada ruled that
“The concept of reasonable doubt is inherently qualitative.  Any attempt to
quantify it may impermissibly lower the prosecution’s burden of proof, and is
likely to confuse rather than clarify.”259  Survey data also suggests that judges
are opposed to quantifying the burden of proof.  Professors Rita James
Simon and Linda Mahan report that over ninety percent of the judges who
participated in their study favored existing practices as opposed to practices
that would require explicit quantification of proof.260  One of the judges
noted that “[p]ercentages or probabilities simply cannot encompass all the
factors, tangible and intangible, in determining guilt—evidence cannot be
evaluated in such terms.”261  This reluctance surprisingly remains, even in
the face of empirical evidence suggesting that quantifying the burden could
be useful.262
The common perception of the burden of proof in criminal trials as an
unquantifiable and absolute principle that requires no reasoned justification
suggests that it might reflect what social psychologists have termed protected
254 Exodus 23:7 (King James).
255 State v. Baldwin, 6 S.C.L. (1 Tread.) 289, 308 (1813) (opinion of Brevard, J.).
256 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970) (quoting Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S.
432, 453 (1895)).
257 Epps, supra note 60, at 1081.
258 See, e.g., Peter Tillers & Jonathan Gottfried, Case Comment—United States v. Cope-
land, 369 F. Supp. 2d 275 (E.D.N.Y. 2005): A Collateral Attack on the Legal Maxim that Proof
Beyond a Reasonable Doubt Is Unquantifiable?, 5 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 135, 135–38 (2006)
(reviewing judicial hostility towards quantification of the burden).
259 McCullough v. State, 657 P.2d 1157, 1159 (Nev. 1983).
260 See Simon & Mahan, supra note 46, at 329. R
261 Id.
262 See, e.g., id. at 329–30; Dorothy K. Kagehiro, Defining the Standard of Proof in Jury
Instructions, 1 PSYCHOL. SCI. 194, 196 (1990).
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(or sacred) values.263  Protected values are instances in which people feel
that absolute deontological rules prohibit certain actions no matter what the
consequences of following those rules are.264  People who hold such values
tend to reject the need to conduct a cost-benefit analysis with respect to them
and even deny that there are any costs entailed with adhering to the pro-
tected value.265
When shifting from abstract philosophical debates to setting public pol-
icy, protected values raise serious problems.  Protected values undermine the
unavoidable tradeoffs that the real world requires, as they are viewed in abso-
lute terms.266  Policymakers who need to decide whether to invest in public
health programs, highway safety, saving an endangered species, or simply bal-
ancing the budget cannot escape the need to put such goals in a single policy
metric.  Yet when doing so, they need to be cautious, as treating a protected
value like any other commensurable good is tantamount to “political sui-
cide.”267  Consequently, the public discourse surrounding protected values
tends to make use of rhetorical obfuscation.268  Such tools enable people to
“be portrayed as both unapologetic defenders of [sacred values] and at the
same time as experts in finding ways to camouflage or overlook
transgressions.”269
Professor Philip Tetlock demonstrated this point in an elegantly
designed experiment in which participants were asked to evaluate a govern-
mental decision to cut the budget of a lifesaving program and shift the
money to reducing the deficit, lowering taxes, and funding programs that
will stimulate the economy.270  Participants in one condition evaluated this
question after being informed that it is was found that the shift in resources is
the morally right thing to do.  Participants in the second condition evaluated
the very same question after being informed that the shift of resources is
grounded in the high cost-per-life-saved of the program.  As the results show,
the use of deontic rhetoric brought about a significant increase in support of
263 For notable contributions to this literature, see Jonathan Baron & Mark Spranca,
Protected Values, 70 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 1 (1997); Philip E.
Tetlock et al., Proscribed Forms of Social Cognition: Taboo Trade-Offs, Blocked Exchanges, Forbid-
den Base Rates, and Heretical Counterfactuals, in RELATIONAL MODELS THEORY: A CONTEMPO-
RARY OVERVIEW 469 (Nick Haslam ed., 2004).  For a recent review of the findings, see
Michael R. Waldmann et al., Moral Judgments, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THINKING AND
REASONING 364, 382–84 (Keith J. Holyoak & Robert G. Morrison eds., 2012).
264 Baron & Spranca, supra note 263, at 3.
265 Id. at 5.
266 See Daniel M. Bartels & Douglas L. Medin, Are Morally Motivated Decision Makers
Insensitive to the Consequences of Their Choices?, 18 PSYCHOL. SCI. 24, 24 (2007) (“[B]y defini-
tion, [protected values] are associated with trade-off avoidance.”).
267 Baron & Spranca, supra note 263, at 14.
268 Waldmann et al., supra note 263, at 383.
269 Id.
270 See Philip E. Tetlock, Coping with Trade-Offs: Psychological Constraints and Political
Implications, in ELEMENTS OF REASON: COGNITION, CHOICE, AND THE BOUNDS OF RATIONALITY
239, 254–55 (Arthur Lupia et al. eds., 2000).
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the budget shift.  Whereas support was around thirty-five percent in the cost-
benefit condition, support soared to seventy-two percent in the moral
condition.271
Viewing the burden of proof as a protected value suggests that the politi-
cal discussion surrounding it cannot be a simple cost-benefit analysis.  True,
people want to deter and incapacitate dangerous offenders, yet they are
unwilling to conduct an explicitly quantifiable tradeoff between punishing
the innocent and achieving those goals.  Adjusting sanctions to the degree of
certainty of guilt through the substantive norms of criminal law enables peo-
ple “to have their non-utilitarian cake and eat it too.”272  While all criminals
under this regime are punished if and only if their guilt has been established
beyond a reasonable doubt, by relaxing the substantive demands for a convic-
tion, the effective burden of proof is reduced and a different balance
between type 1 and type 2 errors is struck.
To be sure, while categorizing the beyond a reasonable doubt standard
as a protected value helps elucidate the unique path that the law took in this
area, it does little to resolve the related normative questions.  On one hand,
one can view protected values and the rhetorical maneuvers conducted to
circumvent them as a type of bias that stands in the way of a reasoned analysis
of difficult policy questions.273  On the other hand, one can view protected
values as a subtle tool that helps prevent the subversion of meaningful cul-
tural institutions.274  The next two Sections, therefore, explore the benefits
of dealing with evidentiary uncertainty through substantive norms from the
perspective of two central normative theories of criminal law: consequential-
ist theories and expressivist theories.
B. The Consequentialist Perspective: Tailoring the Burden of Proof to Fit the
Context
As the discussion above suggested, the concept of a one-size-fits-all bur-
den of proof is difficult to defend within a framework that focuses on setting
ex ante incentives properly because the benefits of deterrence and the risk of
chilling differ between policy domains.275  Furthermore, once incapacitation
is inserted into the policy debate, the need to grade penalties between sub-
ject areas is only intensified.  The incapacitation calculus requires accounting
for the costs associated with incapacitating criminals and the benefits gener-
ated by removing offenders from society.  Both sides of this equation are not
constant across criminal contexts.  The costs of incarceration vary signifi-
cantly depending on the level of security required.  Housing an inmate in a
271 Id. at 255.
272 Baron & Spranca, supra note 263, at 13.
273 See Jonathan Baron, Moral Judgment, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BEHAVIORAL
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 61, 70 (Eyal Zamir & Doron Teichman eds., 2014) (viewing pro-
tected values as a type of overgeneralization).
274 See Alan Page Fiske & Philip E. Tetlock, Taboo Trade-Offs: Reactions to Transactions
that Transgress the Spheres of Justice, 18 POL. PSYCHOL. 255, 291–94 (1997).
275 See supra notes 64–67 and accompanying text.
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maximum-security prison (or its more extreme version—a supermax prison)
can cost two to three times more than housing an inmate in a regular
prison.276  Similarly, different crimes entail distinct social costs, and there-
fore the benefits generated by incarceration are context-dependent as well.
Calibrating sanctions in accordance with the strength of the evidence via
the substantive rules of criminal law allows differentiating the burden of
proof between distinct policy domains.  In areas in which the need to deter
wrongful behavior or incapacitate dangerous individuals dominates, a low
threshold for a conviction can be adopted by broadening the scope of crimi-
nal law.  In other cases in which the risk of chilling benign behavior is of
greater concern, criminal liability can be defined narrowly.  In addition, by
calibrating the penalties in specific low-graded offenses, the legislature can
further fine-tune the balance between deterrence, incapacitation, and chil-
ling benign behavior.
The regulation of sex crimes that target children can serve as a case in
point.  Sex crimes against children are of significant concern to legislatures
given the tremendous harm such crimes cause their victims.277  Furthermore,
in some cases criminalizing behavior related to having sex with children does
not risk chilling socially desirable behavior.  Society may judge that in
instances in which an offender pursues sexual contact with an eight-year-old
victim there is simply no concern that sanctions will inhibit legitimate
behavior.
Against this backdrop, one can view the federal prohibitions against sex-
ually predatory interactions with children as geared towards reducing the
burden of proof in this narrow category of cases.  More specifically, 18 U.S.C.
§ 2422(b) criminalizes internet and phone communications aimed at entic-
ing children to engage in prostitution or sexual activities.  According to one
court, posting an advertisement on Craigslist seeking sexual contact with chil-
dren is sufficient to convict the posting individual of a crime under
§ 2422(b).278  Undoubtedly, § 2422(b) represents a significant redrawing of
the preparation-attempt borderline that enlarges the scope of criminal liabil-
ity.279  One commentator has recently noted that the section “obliterates
attempt doctrine’s substantial step requirement.”280
276 See A. Mitchell Polinsky, Deterrence and the Optimality of Rewarding Prisoners for Good
Behavior, 44 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 1, 1 (2015).
277 See, e.g., Joseph H. Beitchman et al., A Review of the Long-Term Effects of Child Sexual
Abuse, 16 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 101 (1992); David Finkelhor & Angela Browne, The
Traumatic Impact of Child Sexual Abuse: A Conceptualization, 55 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 530,
530–38 (1985).
278 See United States v. Nestor, 574 F.3d 159, 161 (3d Cir. 2009).  For a more restrictive
interpretation of § 2422(b), see United States v. Gladish, 536 F.3d 646, 649 (7th Cir. 2008),
in which the court held that a defendant must take some specific actions beyond speech in
order to be convicted.
279 See Michal Buchhandler-Raphael, Overcriminalizing Speech, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1667,
1694 (2015).
280 Id.
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Viewed from an evidentiary standpoint, § 2422(b) reflects a decision by
the legislature to recalibrate the burden of proof in the context of sexual
offenses committed against children in favor of more false positives.  In all
likelihood, the adoption of § 2422(b) brought about the conviction of inno-
cent defendants—innocent in the sense that, despite taking preparatory
steps towards having sex with a minor, the defendants did not have the
resolve to go through with the plan.  Nonetheless, § 2422(b) reduces the
amount of false acquittals and enables the state to punish more people who
intend to have sex with children.  Thus, the section reflects a specific balance
between the costs of chilling communications of a sexual nature between
adults and children (and other speech that lies in the penumbra of this
behavior) and deterring and incapacitating pedophiles.281
To be sure, the evidentiary theory of punishment does not offer an auto-
matic justification for all broadening of criminal liability that rests on an
alleged need to adjust the burden of proof in a concrete context.  It is quite
possible that upon closer examination (which is beyond the scope of this
Article), one would discover that the balance struck in § 2422(b) can only be
explained by the political economy of criminal legislation, which tends to
systematically broaden the scope of prohibitions and ratchet up sanctions.282
Thus, any evidentiary balance struck in a concrete criminal context should
rest on sound empirical and normative grounds.
C. The Expressive Perspective: Sustaining the Social Meaning of a Conviction
Expressive theories of criminal law focus on the communicative function
of punishment.283  Within an expressive framework, punishment is not only
about inflicting suffering on wrongdoers.284  Rather, punishment is the way
281 An additional example of such a policy can be found in the context of city ordi-
nances that forbid adults who are not accompanying a child from entering into designated
play areas in public parks. See, e.g., N.Y., DEP’T OF PARKS & RECREATION RULES & REGULA-
TIONS §§ 1–05(s)(1).  The nature of the act covered by these ordinances coupled with the
lack of a mens rea requirement suggests that they might encompass nonculpable individu-
als.  Nonetheless, legislatures have decided that such an individual should be subject to a
relatively mild sanction given the specific risks associated with such conduct.
282 See generally William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L.
REV. 505 (2001).
283 For an early contribution to this body of work, see Joel Feinberg, The Expressive
Function of Punishment, 49 MONIST 397 (1965), reprinted in JOEL FEINBERG, DOING AND
DESERVING 95 (1970).  For a later discussion of the theory, see Dan M. Kahan, The Secret
Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413, 419–25 (1999).  Expressive theories of punish-
ment are part of a general theory of the law.  Prominent contributions to this body of work
include Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social
Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2121 (1990); Cass R.
Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021 (1996).  For a critical
view on expressive theories, see Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical
Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1363 (2000).
284 Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 593
(1996).
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in which society enunciates its condemnation of an offensive act.285  By
criminalizing certain acts and determining the appropriate sanction for
engaging in such acts, criminal law can echo the values of the community.286
For example, the creation of hate crimes or the use of specific types of sanc-
tions (e.g., death, shaming) can be explained by the symbolic nature of these
legal vessels.287  In addition, the social meaning of criminal prohibitions can
bolster the power of social norms and thus help promote the goals of a com-
munity enacting them.288  For instance, sodomy laws can serve to convey a
message of contempt to the gay community and perpetuate homophobic
norms, even when they are unenforced.289
Legal scholars have stressed the importance of the beyond a reasonable
doubt standard in sustaining the expressive function of criminal law.  Profes-
sor Laurence Tribe has long argued that the standard is tied to the condemn-
ing function of criminal law.290  According to this line of thought,
acknowledging the existence of quantifiable doubt while simultaneously
blaming the defendant undermines the communicative power of a convic-
tion.  A conviction needs to convey information that the defendant did some-
thing wrong, for example murder or rape; a complex message according to
which the defendant with some probability killed or raped is one that cannot
form the basis of the condemnation of the defendant.
When presenting the case for a penal regime that incorporates eviden-
tiary uncertainty into sentencing, Professor Fisher attempts to rebut this
expressive concern.291  According to Fisher, a probabilistic penal regime is
actually desirable from an expressive perspective because it allows the legal
system to convey precise signals regarding culpability.  As she notes, such a
regime
would allow for a more nuanced and sophisticated answer to the question of
criminal responsibility.  By creating multiple standards of criminal convic-
tion, the probabilistic model would facilitate a more accurate reflection of
the evidentiary gray areas that permeate criminal decision making, and
would enable finer regulation of the accompanying social sanctions.292
285 Id.; see also Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in
Criminal Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 351–52 (1996).
286 Id.
287 See Kahan, supra note 283, at 439 (expressive analysis of death penalty); Kahan,
supra note 284, at 630–52 (expressive analysis of shaming).
288 See Sunstein, supra note 283, at 2029–33.
289 See Terry S. Kogan, Legislative Violence Against Lesbians and Gay Men, 1994 UTAH L.
REV. 209, 232–34.  Interestingly, laws that require dog owners to collect the poop of their
pets have also captured the attention of numerous expressivist theorists. See Robert D.
Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural Approach to Adjudicating the
New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643, 1675 (1996); Sunstein, supra note 283, at
2032–33.
290 See Tribe, supra note 58, at 1372–75; see also Carol S. Steiker, Punishment and Proce-
dure: Punishment Theory and the Criminal-Civil Procedural Divide, 85 GEO. L.J. 775, 808 (1997).
291 Fisher, supra note 10, at 867–71. R
292 Id. at 868.
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While this argument nicely explains why graduated sanctions based on a
probabilistic assessment of the evidence are warranted, it fails to deal with the
expressive argument as such.  For the expressive function of the law to oper-
ate with a probabilistic sentencing regime, the populace would have to be
acutely attuned to the intricate details of legal decisions.  The specifics of the
factual reasoning and the estimated probability of guilt would have to be
conveyed to the public, who will then have to comprehend this complex mes-
sage.  Fisher envisions a world in which “[t]he transparency as to the extent
of epistemic doubt, incorporated into the verdict, would allow the public to
calculate the gravity of condemnation of the given criminal conduct under
the assumption of maximal certainty.”293
The problem with this vision is that criminal law does not convey infor-
mation in such a manner; it is not a “nuanced” form of communication.
When the criminal law fulfills its expressive function, it communicates with
all members of the community and not with a small subset of people attuned
to the details of legal rulings.  To this end, its messages need to be simple and
clear and cannot incorporate a multitude of dimensions that are beyond the
comprehension of many members of its audience.  This is why criminal law
does not adjust penalties downward to account for the adverse consequences
of a conviction, even if such adjustments are required from a normative per-
spective.294  Decreasing sanctions in such a manner would not only “dilute
the expressive force of the criminal sanction in the particular case,” but
would also “work to undermine the criminal law’s more general moralizing,
educative, and norm-building function in the long term.”295
The specific context of probabilistic guilt raises even greater difficulties
from an expressive perspective.  For one thing, people tend to vastly disagree
over the meaning of probabilistic terms.  When physicians were asked to put
a numeric figure on the term “likely,” their answers ranged between 25% and
75%.296  Similarly, the meaning of the term “very likely” ranged between
30% and 90%.297  This, of course, does not imply that the law could not try
to construct the social meaning of probabilistic terms, just as it attempts to do
with respect to “reasonable doubt,” but one has to acknowledge at the outset
the gravity of the task.
An additional problem in the probabilistic context that the law can do
very little about stems from people’s poor understanding of probabilistic
terms.  While the readers of this Article (certainly those who have made it
this far) know how many times a coin will come up heads if flipped 1000
times, can figure out what 1% of 1000 is, and can turn a proportion such as
293 Id. at 870.
294 Richard A. Bierschbach & Alex Stein, Overenforcement, 93 GEO. L.J. 1743, 1749–56
(2005).
295 Id. at 1750.
296 Dianne C. Berry et al., Patients’ Understanding of Risk Associated with Medication Use:
Impact of European Commission Guidelines and Other Risk Scales, 26 DRUG SAFETY 1, 2 (2003).
297 Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\93-2\NDL207.txt unknown Seq: 52  5-JAN-18 8:45
808 notre dame law review [vol. 93:2
1:1000 into a percentage, a significant part of the population cannot.298
More specifically, one study found that 30% of people “had 0 correct
answers, 28% had 1 correct answer, 26% had 2 correct answers, and 16% had
3 correct answers.”299  Given this level of comprehension, criminal law can-
not be expected to communicate to the public the subtle nuances associated
with probabilistic guilt.
By utilizing the substantive path, however, the legal system can overcome
these problems and simultaneously adjust sanctions in accordance with the
probability of guilt and sustain the expressive function of the law.  The sub-
stantive path requires the legal system to define the precise crimes that will
lower the decision threshold.  These crimes then become part of the commu-
nicative structure of criminal law.  They convey a social message as to the
degree of evidentiary certainty and encompass a simple signal as to the level
of condemnation a defendant deserves.  They state: “It has been proved
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed a crime that
reflects a 70% probability of guilt and should be punished accordingly.”
Now, it is uncontested that this statement is awkward and that the Pulitzer
Prize will probably not be awarded to the jurist who came up with it.  Never-
theless, this legal construct can achieve the goal of grading penalties in accor-
dance with the probability of guilt while sending a simple message to society.
To be sure, as the legal system shifts the treatment of evidentiary uncer-
tainty into the substantive arena it runs a risk of eroding the expressive power
of the law.  If the criminal law encompasses conduct that is not sufficiently
tied to blameworthy behavior, it might lose its moral authority and its blam-
ing power.300  The goal of this Article is not to draw a precise boundary
between justifiable and unjustifiable prohibitions.  Rather, it is to highlight
the function of some prohibitions and to defend the conceptual framework
that lies at their core.
CONCLUSION
This Article presented a theory of criminal punishment and evidentiary
uncertainty.  It argued that given the constitutional limitation on relaxing the
burden of proof in criminal trials, legislatures have turned to substantive
norms to structure the decision threshold.  More specifically, legislatures
have created a de facto evidentiary graded penal regime in which, as the
strength of the evidence grows, so do the sanctions the offender is subject to.
The Article reviewed numerous doctrines of criminal law relating both to the
298 See Lisa M. Schwartz et al., The Role of Numeracy in Understanding the Benefit of Screening
Mammography, 127 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 966, 969 (1997).
299 Id.  For similar findings with a more educated pool of subjects, see Isaac M. Lipkus
et al., General Performance on a Numeracy Scale Among Highly Educated Samples, 21 MED. DECI-
SION MAKING 37, 39 (2001).
300 For an argument against the broad scope of criminal prohibitions along these lines,
see Ronald L. Gainer, Federal Criminal Code Reform: Past and Future, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 45,
78 (1998).
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objective and subjective elements of the crime and showed how they fit
within this theoretical framework.
Significant research remains to be done based on the insights provided
in this Article.  On the theoretical side, this Article sampled only a small sub-
set of doctrines from the universe of criminal law.  Future studies should turn
from the broad analysis associated with a paper presenting a general theory
to a detailed analysis focusing on the unique features of discrete legal con-
texts.  Such an analysis could help map the scope of the explanatory force of
the theory and delineate the domains in which other considerations trump.
Additionally, this paper focused exclusively on the interaction between evi-
dentiary crimes and the population subject to them.  Further research is
needed to examine the way in which evidentiary crimes influence the behav-
ior of the enforcers of criminal law.  Such research will need to delve into the
black box of prosecutorial discretion and examine questions such as whether
prosecutors aim for convictions that fully account for the accused’s deeds, or
whether they simply aim to maximize the number of convictions.  On the
empirical side, this Article opens the door to a wide body of potential future
research.  Such research could focus on experimental methods and measure
the degree to which evidentiary confidence explains penal intuitions, or turn
to field studies (both qualitative and quantitative) that will document eviden-
tiary decision in the courtroom.
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